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THE LEGAL, ETHICAL, AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF THE "REASONABLE
WOMAN" STANDARD IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CASES
ROBERT S. ADLER *
ELLEN R. PEIRCE**
In this Article, Professors Adler and Peirce examine the development and impli-
cations of the "reasonable woman" standard that is gaining increasing accept-
ance as the appropriate gauge for measuring the offensiveness of the conduct at
issue in sexual harassment cases. The authors begin by reviewing the origins of
sexual harassment law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, paying
particular attention to the history of "hostile environment" causes of action.
Professors Adler and Peirce then discuss how and why the reasonable woman
standard evolved as an alternative to the conventional "reasonable man" and
"reasonable person "standards that had been the usual measures of culpable con-
duct in sexual harassment cases, and how courts have applied the reasonable
woman standard in cases involving a wide range of allegedly harassing behaviors.
The authors conclude by discussing a variety of important concerns raised by the
implementation of the reasonable woman standard, including the fundamental
question of whether it is fair to hold men to a standard of conduct that, because
they are men, they may be unable to understand or appreciate fully.
INTRODUCTION
UI CH controversy and confusion surround the appropriate stan-
diard of review for evaluating "hostile environment"' sexual har-
assment cases.2 In a 1986 decision, the Supreme Court directed lower
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Kenan-Flagler School of Business, Univer-
sity of North Carolina; A.B., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Michigan.
** Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Kenan-Flagler School of Business, Univer-
sity of North Carolina; B.A., Bryn Mawr; J.D., Duke University.
1. The term "hostile environment" in sexual harassment cases refers to employment
contexts in which unwelcome sexual conduct unreasonably interferes with an individual's
job performance or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. For a
discussion of the term's history and development, see infra notes 30-152 and accompany-
ing text
2. See e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "a
female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment when
she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or per-
vasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment") (emphasis added); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.
1986) (asserting that "the trier of fact, when judging the totality of the circumstances
impacting upon the asserted abusive and hostile environment... must adopt the perspec-
tive of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment under essentially like or
similar circumstances"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that both a subjective
and an objective standard need to be applied in evaluating allegedly harassing conduct).
Within the First Circuit, confusion abounds regarding the appropriate perspective to
apply in evaluating harassing conduct. One court has applied a "two perspective stan-
dard." See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (stat-
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courts to assess, in examining allegedly harassing conduct, whether the
conduct was both unwelcome and so severe or pervasive that it altered
the plaintiff's working environment.3 This directive, however, leaves
open the question of whose perspective-that of the particular victim, a
reasonable person undifferentiated by sex, or a reasonable woman 4 -the
fact finder should use to assess the seriousness of the offense. Herein lies
the dilemma: When sexual harassment is at issue, "[s]ome see it ...
some won't.' '5
Recently, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
addressed this problem in a publication titled Policy Guidance on Current
Issues of Sexual Harassment.6 In that document, the EEOC recom-
mended that "[i]n determining whether harassment is sufficiently severe
or pervasive to create a hostile environment, the harasser's conduct
should be evaluated from the objective standpoint of a 'reasonable per-
son.' ",7 The EEOC further stated that Title VII should not serve as a
"vehicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hypersensitive."8
That is, unless the challenged conduct substantially affects the work envi-
ronment of a reasonable person, no Title VII violation will be found.'
The EEOC did, however, temper this position by pointing out that such
an objective standard should take into consideration "the victim's per-
spective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior.""0
ing that the trier of fact should consider both the man's and the woman's perspectives).
Another has adopted a "reasonable person" standard. See Morgan v. Massachusetts
Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 193 (Ist Cir. 1990). And yet a third has addressed harassing
behavior from the standpoint of the particular plaintiff. See Chamberlain v. 101 Realty,
Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 784 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and
Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 Yale L.J.
1177 (1990) (criticizing both the "reasonable person" and "reasonable woman" stan-
dards); Georgia A. Staton & Angela K. Sinner, Sexual Harassment: the 'Reasonable Wo-
man' Standard, 33 For The Defense 6 (Dec. 1991) (analyzing implications of adopting
the reasonable woman standard); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work En-
vironment Under Title VII, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1449, 1459 (1984) (advocating adoption of a
"reasonable woman" standard).
3. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67-68 (1986).
4. Or, alternatively, from the perspective of a reasonable man in those cases in which
the plaintiff is male.
5. Eliza G. C. Collins & Timothy B. Blodgett, Sexual Harassment... Some See It
... Some Won't, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.- Apr. 1981, at 76, 92 (finding little recognition of
sexual harassment by upper level management). As discussed in a recent article, conduct
that women perceive as sexual harassment will not necessarily be perceived as such by
men. See Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Proce-
dures, 46 Am. Psychol., 497, 499 (1991); see also Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico,
864 F.2d 881, 898 n.19 (1st Cir. 1991) (discussing and citing report concerning the differ-
ent perceptions of men and women toward sexual harassment).
6. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of
Sexual Harassment, N-915-050 (BNA) 89 (March 19, 1990) [hereinafter Policy Guidance
on Current Issues].
7. Id.
8. Id. (quoting Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis.
1984)).
9. See id.
10. Id. at 103.
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Although the "reasonable person"'11 standard has long been accepted
by most courts as the correct measure for evaluating allegedly culpable
conduct, most notably in negligence cases,12 a number of commentators 13
and courts14 have recently challenged its applicability in cases of sexual
harassment. At the heart of this debate, as we shall discuss, is a body of
research"5 suggesting that men and women differ in their judgments of
what particular behaviors and comments constitute sexual harassment.
This issue was summed up succinctly in a recent case:
A male supervisor might believe, for example, that it is legitimate for
him to tell a female subordinate that she has a "great figure" or "nice
legs." The female subordinate, however, may find such comments of-
fensive. Such a situation presents a dilemma for both the man and the
woman: the man may not realize that his comments are offensive, and
the woman may be fearful of criticizing her supervisor. 16
11. We presume that the reasonable man standard has been almost universally set
aside in favor of the "reasonable person" standard, thereby incorporating, in theory at
least, the feminine as well as masculine standard. See infra note 212 and accompanying
text. One of the earliest reported uses of the reasonable man standard occurred in a 19th
century British case, Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837). In that case, the
court stated that "[i]nstead... of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-
extensive with the judgment of each individual... we ought rather to adhere to the rule
which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would
observe." Id. at 493 (emphasis added). The reasonableness test, as it has developed, is
intended to reflect changing social mores as well as to present an objective standard that
imposes the same behavior on everyone, thereby limiting arbitrary or politically based
decision-making by judges. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of
Torts 173-75 (5th ed. 1984); Ronald K. L. Collins, Language, History and The Legal
Process A Profile of the 'Reasonable Man,' 8 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 311 (1977).
12. See Keeton et al., supra note 11, at 175.
13. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1206 (1989) ("If judges continue to strive for
the ostensibly objective perspective in assessing sexual harassment claims, then they will
succeed primarily in entrenching the male-centered views of harassment that prevail in
many workplaces."); Ehrenreich, supra note 2, at 1177 ("My primary purpose is to offer
an explanation for how the reasonable person test retains its legitimacy in the face of
numerous analytical weaknesses.").
14. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting the reason-
able woman rather than the reasonable person standard, explaining that "[i]f we only
examined whether a reasonable person would engage in allegedly harassing conduct, we
would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination"); Radtke v. Ever-
ett, 471 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Mich. App. 1991) ("[W]e believe that in a sexual harassment
case involving a woman, the proper perspective to view the offensive conduct from is that
of the 'reasonable woman,' not that of the 'reasonable person.' "), appeal granted, 487
N.W.2d 762 (Mich. 1992).
15. See Alison M. Konrad & Barbara A. Gutek, Impact of Work Experiences on Atti-
tudes Toward Sexual Harassment, 31 Admin. Sci. Q. 422 (1986); Gary N. Powell, Effects
of Sex Role Identity and Sex on Definitions of Sexual Harassment, 14 Sex Roles 9 (1986).
But see The Roper Org. Inc., Most Americans Say Sexual Harassment At Work Not A
Problem, Roper Reports No. 92-1 (1992) [hereinafter Roper Poll] (reporting on poll re-
sults indicating that, notwithstanding the publicity and public debate attending the Clar-
ence Thomas hearings, sexual harassment in the workplace is not common, and that the
vast majority of Americans are satisfied with the way their employers are treating the
problem).
16. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (Ist Cir. 1988).
1993]
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One study that examined whether women perceive sexual overtures in
a different light than men found that men see such comments from wo-
men as flattering while women find similar comments from men as insult-
ing.17 Another study indicates that men view milder forms of behavior
such as "suggestive looks, repeated requests for dates and sexist jokes, as
harmless social interactions to which only overly-sensitive women would
object."' 8 Women, however, are more likely to see this behavior as overt
harassment. 19
As suggested above, courts differ on which standard should be used to
judge allegedly harassing conduct. While a number of courts adhere to
the traditional "reasonable person"2 standard, others modify the reason-
able person standard through a two-step "subjective/objective" approach
that explicitly considers the perspective both of the victim and of a rea-
sonable person.21 Along similar lines, one court has indicated that the
fact finder should apply both male and female perspectives in evaluating
the conduct at issue.22 In addition, and most important for our present
discussion, a growing number of courts have concluded that the differing
social experiences of men and women warrant a new standard in sexual
17. See Barbara A. Gutek, Sex and the Workplace (1985).
18. Ehrenreich, supra note 2, at 1207 n.10; Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence:
Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 Yale J.L. & Feminism 41, 60 n.64 (1989).
19. See Ehrenreich, supra note 2, at 1207-08.
20. See, e.g., Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 580 (10th
Cir. 1990) ("reasonable person in plaintiff's position would not have felt compelled to
resign"); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 193 (1st Cir. 1990) (adopt-
ing the "reasonable person" approach); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611,
620 (6th Cir. 1986) (trier of fact, when judging the totality of the circumstances with
respect to the asserted abusive and hostile environment must adopt the perspective of a
reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment under like circumstances); Bennett
v. New York City Dep't of Corrections, 705 F. Supp. 979, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (if evi-
dence leads a reasonable person in a similar situation to find the environment offensive,
then liability should attach under Title VII); Hollis v. Fleetguard, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 631,
636-37 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) (if reasonable person would not have been affected by the
alleged harassing behavior, the claim fails).
21. See, eg., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3rd Cir. 1990)
(maintaining that the subjective factor is crucial because it shows that the alleged conduct
injured the particular plaintiff and the objective standard protects the employer from the
"hypersensitive" employee); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (concluding that the question of whether the harassment affected
the victim should be judged from the perspective of both the victim and that of a reason-
able woman). Several Seventh Circuit cases have held that the trial court should apply
both an objective and subjective analysis to evaluate the likely effect of the defendant's
conduct upon a reasonable person's ability to perform his or her work and upon his or
her well-being, as well as the actual effect upon the particular plaintiff bringing the claim.
See King v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990); Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff
Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th
Cir. 1989). For the most part, there is no practical difference between this subjective/
objective approach and the "reasonable woman" approach. In both cases, the victim
must establish both that she individually was offended and that a reasonable woman
would also be offended.
22. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988).
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harassment cases-that of the "reasonable woman."'  In 1991, the
Ninth Circuit expressly adopted this standard in Ellison v. Brady,2" a
case that received widespread publicity." In that case, the Ninth Circuit
justified its rejection of the "reasonable person" standard in favor of the
"reasonable woman" approach by explaining that "a sex-blind reason-
able person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically
ignore the experiences of women. '" 26
The adoption of a "sex-specific" standard raises a host of questions,
not the least of which is the issue of whether it is fair to hold males to a
standard that, because they are males, they may be unable to appreciate
or understand fully. In this Article, we examine the development of the
"reasonable woman" standard and consider the legal, ethical and social
issues raised by the implementation of such a standard. Section I reviews
the general history of sexual harassment causes of action and the leading
cases in this area.27 Section II identifies the different standards of review
applied in harassment cases, culminating in a discussion of the reason-
able woman standard. 2 Finally, Section III explores the legal, ethical,
and social questions that warrant consideration prior to the widespread
adoption of the reasonable woman standard as the appropriate gauge for
measuring culpable conduct in sexual harassment cases.29
I. ORIGINS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
A. Pre-EEOC Guidelines
Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196430 clearly prohibits
23. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a female
plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment when she alleges conduct that a
reasonable woman would consider severe and pervasive); Andrews v. City of Philadel-
phia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (standard should be that of the reasonable
person of the same sex); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding
that, in a sexual harassment case, "it seems only reasonable" that the person standing in
the shoes of the employee should be the reasonable woman); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, L, dissenting in part and concurring in
part) (advocating a reasonable victim/woman standard); Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523 (M.D. Fla 1991) (noting significance of the fact that
certain conduct affects women more than men).
24. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
25. News reports commenting on Ellison included the following: Michelle Galen,
Ending Sexual Harassment Business Is Getting the Message, Bus. Wk., Mar. 18, 1991, at
98-100; Ruth Marcus, When Is Flirting At Work Sexual Harassment?, Wash. Post, Feb.
28. 1991, at A32; and Georgia Sargeant, Sexual Harassment Cases Still Murky, 27 Trial
14 (1991).
26. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
27. See infra notes 30-152 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 153-180 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 181-292 and accompanying text.
30. Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1988 &
Supp. I 1990) [hereinafter Title VII] reads in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
1993]
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sex discrimination, there is virtually no legislative history to guide courts
in interpreting the extent to which the Act protects women against sexual
harassment in the workplace. Sexual harassment 31 was not even identi-
fied as a cause of action under the Act by the courts until 1976, more
than a decade after the passage of Title VII. In that 1976 case, Williams
v. Saxbe,32 the court held that sexual advances directed at the plaintiff by
her supervisor were made because of her sex, thereby bringing the matter
within the purview of Title VII.
Despite this decision, a number of federal district courts continued to
be reluctant to recognize claims for sexual harassment, at least until the
publication of the EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment in 1983. 33 In
explaining this reluctance, some district courts reasoned that the harass-
ment was personal in nature and thus not solely based on gender.34
Others held that sexual harassment claims sounded only in tort law.3
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). The inclusion of sex as a protected category under
Title VII came as a last minute addition to the Act and was inserted by opponents of the
bill in an attempt to defeat it. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2577-84, 2718-21 (1964); Charles
Whalen & Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act 233-34 (1985) (characterizing women as "accidental beneficiar[ies]" of the
Civil Rights Act); see also Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond
Damages Control, 3 Yale J.L. & Feminism 299 n.1 (1991).
31. One scholar, Catherine MacKinnon, defines sexual harassment as "the unwanted
imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power."
Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 1 (1979).
32. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell,
587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
33. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1992) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines]. The EEOC Guide-
lines, discussed infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text, are interpretive regulations.
Although they do not have the force of law, they have been relied on by a number of
courts in sexual harassment cases. See Downes v. Federal Aviation Admin., 775 F.2d
288 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Henson v. City of Dundee 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In the first opportunity that the Supreme Court
took to discuss the legal effect of the EEOC Guidelines, the Court stated that the Guide-
lines " 'while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance.'" Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976), quoting in turn, Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
34. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). This was one of the first reported cases dealing with
sexual harassment. The plaintiffs alleged that their supervisor repeatedly made sexual
overtures to them, creating a work situation that became so intolerable they resigned.
They sued for relief under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination through sexual harass-
ment. The court found that Title VII was not applicable, commenting that the supervi-
sor's conduct appeared to be "nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity, or
mannerism." Id. at 163; see also Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123,
124 (D.D.C. 1974) (concluding that the alleged harassment was simply an outcome of the
inharmonious relationship between the parties), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
35. See Seritis v. Lane, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980),
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Still others dismissed offensive sexual activity as simply a natural conse-
quence of the attraction between men and women. 36 A number of these
decisions were reversed on appeal, however, and the plaintiffs were ulti-
mately allowed to recover under Title VII.
31
B. Impact of the 1983 EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment
Published in 1983, the EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Sex (the "EEOC Guidelines") define sexual harassment as
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other ver-
bal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."' 38 Under the EEOC Guide-
lines, sexual harassment is actionable when coupled with one of three
circumstances:
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for em-
ployment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment. 3
9
The courts have recognized two variants of sexual harassment, both of
which are incorporated in the EEOC Guidelines: "quid pro quo" cases
and "hostile environment" cases. A quid pro quo cause of action arises
aff'd sub nom. Seritis v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, 37 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1501 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Until passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which provides for compensatory and punitive damages in cases involving inten-
tional sexual harassment, federal courts interpreted the Act to provide only equitable
remedies such as reinstatement, back pay and injunctive relief. See Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (1991) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a). For a review of common law causes of action for sexual harassment, see Terry
M. Dworkin et al., Theories of Recovery for Sexual Harassment Going Beyond Title VI,
25 San Diego L. Rev. 125 (1988), and Jane L. Dolkart & E. Lynn Malchow, Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace Expanding Remedies, 23 Tort & Ins. LJ. 181 (1987). The
use of common law has not been entirely superseded by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, how-
ever, because plaintiffs may still opt to pursue common law remedies to avoid the ceiling
placed on the amount of recovery under the Civil Rights Act.
36. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
37. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
38. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, § 1604.11(a).
39. Id
40. Professor MacKinnon was one of the first writers to make a distinction between
types of hostile environment: those that create an offensive environment ("condition of
work") and those in which a supervisor demands sexual consideration in exchange for job
benefits ("quid pro quo"). See MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 32-47. On a practical level,
there are a number of cases that can be characterized as both "condition of work" or
"quid pro quo" sexual harassment. See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568
F.2d 1044, 1046, 1046 n.1 (3d Cir. 1977). Quid pro quo sexual harassment is defined in
the EEOC Guidelines at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)(2). "Hostile environment" is defined at
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3). The EEOC Guidelines, in a section entitled "Other related
practices," also provide for another type of sexual harassment. Where an employment
opportunity or benefit is granted because of an individual's "submission to the employer's
19931
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when a supervisor offers an economic or other job benefit, or threatens to
withhold such benefits (including job retention) in exchange for sexual
favors.41 Quid pro quo claims are analytically similar to "disparate treat-
ment" claims under Title VII,42 and the same framework governs the
burden of proof.43 That is, the plaintiff must show that she is a member
of a protected class, that she was treated differently than members of an
unprotected class, and that this treatment was unfair.
The second type of sexual harassment claim, "hostile environment,"
arises when the unwelcome sexual conduct unreasonably interferes with
the individual's job performance, or creates an intimidating, hostile or
offensive work environment.' Although the courts identified quid pro
quo causes of action as early as 1976," 5 they did not apply "hostile envi-
ronment" analysis46 until 1981.17
sexual advances or requests for sexual favors," the employer may be liable for unlawful
discrimination against others who were qualified for, but were denied, the opportunity or
benefit. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (emphasis added). The courts have not yet clarified
whether a Title VII violation can be established under these circumstances, however. See
DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 825 (1987); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Broderick v.
Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (D.D.C. 1988); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of America, 679
F. Supp. 495, 499-501 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Policy
Guidance on Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, N-915-048 (Jan.
1990).
41. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986); Downes v. Federal
Aviation Admin., 775 F.2d 288, 290-91 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,
254-55 (4th Cir. 1983); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn.
1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 667
(D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); 1 Lex K. Larson, Employment Discrimination § 41.64(a) (1992).
42. For a discussion of "disparate treatment" cases, see infra notes 251-54 and ac-
companying text.
43. See Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII,
supra note 2, at 1454-55.
44. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1991) (fact that female
worker received bizarre love letters from a male co-worker established a prima facie case
of hostile environment sexual harassment); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir.
1983) (plaintiff established a case for hostile environment harassment by showing that the
workplace was pervaded with sexual slurs, insults and innuendo, and that she was subject
to vulgar and offensive sexually-related epithets); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 903-05 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (cause of action established by showing that plaintiff's su-
pervisor subjected her to numerous demeaning sexual inquiries and vulgarities, and that
he repeatedly asked that she have sex with him); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-48
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (plaintiff established cause of action by showing that she was subject to
sexual intimidation that was "standard operating procedure" in the defendant's
workplace).
45. The first quid pro quo case found actionable under Title VII was Williams v.
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell,
587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
46. A cause of action for "hostile environment" discrimination first arose in the con-
text of racial discrimination in Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454
F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). The plaintiff, Rogers, did not
claim that her employer had deprived her of a job benefit, but instead charged that the
employer's disparate treatment of Hispanic clients created a discriminatory and offensive
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C. Menitor Savings Bank v. Vinson: The Supreme Court
Sets a Standard
Application of "hostile environment" analysis to sexual harassment
cases gained considerable momentum as a result of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson," the case in which the Court
first addressed and approved the "hostile environment" theory of sex dis-
crimination. In discussing the elements necessary to establish a hostile
work environment cause of action under Title VII, the Court relied upon
the applicable EEOC guidelines enacted under Title VI 9 and upon the
Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Henson v. City of Dundee."
As described in Meritor, Ms. Vinson, the plaintiff, was hired in 1974 by
Mr. Taylor, her supervisor, as a teller trainee at the defendant bank.
During Ms. Vinson's tenure as a bank employee, Mr. Taylor repeatedly
asked her to submit to his sexual advances. Ms. Vinson testified that Mr.
Taylor made repeated demands for sexual favors at the office as well as
after hours, and that she ultimately acquiesced for fear of losing her job.
Ms. Vinson further testified that Mr. Taylor raped her on several occa-
sions, fondled her in front of other employees, pursued her into the wo-
men's restroom, and exposed himself to her. This harassment continued
for three years.
In 1978, the bank terminated Ms. Vinson, citing excessive use of sick
leave as the reason for her firing. Shortly thereafter, she sued the bank
and Mr. Taylor alleging a cause of action under Title VII for sexual har-
assment. The district court, trying the case as Vinson v. Taylor, denied
work environment for its Hispanic employees. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the em-
ployer had violated Title VII, stating that the phrase "terms, conditions or privileges of
employment" under Title VII is an expansive concept that includes "within its protective
ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or
racial discrimination.... One can readily envision working environments so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological
stability of minority group workers." Id at 238; accord Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1979) (requiring female bank employees to
wear uniforms while the men were allowed to wear suits violates Title VII by perpetuat-
ing demeaning sexual stereotypes); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St.
Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977) (segregated eating
clubs condoned but not organized by the employer violated Title VII by creating a dis-
criminatory work environment); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 161 (S.D.
Ohio 1976) (demeaning religious slurs by supervisor violate Title VII).
47. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.D.C. 1981). Bundy was subjected to
demeaning requests by her supervisors for sexual encounters. When she complained
about these acts to a senior supervisor, he casually dismissed her complaints, stating,
"'any man in his right mind would want to rape you.'" Id at 940 (citation omitted).
The supervisor then proceeded to proposition her. In drawing from the body of hostile
environment cases, the court reasoned "[h]ow then can sexual harassment, which injects
the most demeaning sexual stereotypes into the general work environment and which
always represents an intentional assault on an individual's innermost privacy, not be ile-
gal?" Id at 945.
48. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
49. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
50. 682 F.2d 897 (1lth Cir. 1982).
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Ms. Vinson relief under Title VII, finding that the sexual activity en-
gaged in was voluntary and that it was not a condition of her employ-
ment or advancement on the job."1 The court further stated that the
bank could not be held liable for Mr. Taylor's misconduct because it was
without notice of its occurrence.5
2
The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that because the lower court had
analyzed the case strictly from the traditional "quid pro quo" perspec-
tive, it had not properly considered whether the evidence supported a
"hostile environment" claim. 3 In a 1981 case, Bundy v. Jackson, 4 the
D.C. Circuit had been one of the first courts to recognize a "hostile envi-
ronment" cause of action. The D.C. Circuit relied heavily on Bundy in
its Vinson opinion, particularly on its recognition in Bundy that a woman
51. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980).
52. See id. at 42. The findings of fact made by the district court included the
following:
[4] Plaintiff was not required to grant Taylor or any other member of [the
bank] sexual favors as a condition of either her employment or in order to ob-
tain promotion.
[5] If the plaintiff and Taylor did engage in an intimate or sexual relationship
... that relationship was a voluntary one by plaintiff having nothing to do with
her continued employment at [the bank] or her advancement or promotions at
that institution.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also David Holtzman & Eric Trelz, Recent Developments in the
Law of Sexual Harassment: Abusive Environment Claims after Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 31 St. Louis U. L.J. 239, 251 (1987).
53. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Court of Appeals
stated:
Vinson's grievance was clearly of the [sexual environment] type and accord-
ingly, her case counseled an inquiry as to whether Taylor "created or condoned
a substantially discriminatory work environment, regardless of whether the
complaining employees lost any tangible job benefits as a result of the
discrimination."
Id. at 145 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
54. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court in Bundy drew parallels from racial
and ethnic "hostile environment" decisions in reaching its determination that such a
cause of action could be brought for sex discrimination cases. See Rogers v. Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 197 1), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972). In drawing these parallels, the Bundy court reasoned:
The relevance of these "discriminatory environment" cases to sexual harass-
ment is beyond serious dispute. Racial or ethnic discrimination against the
company's minority clients may reflect no intent to discriminate directly against
a company's minority employees, but in poisoning the atmosphere of employ-
ment it violates Title VII. Sexual stereotyping through discriminatory dress
requirements may be benign in intent, and may offend women only in a general,
atmospheric manner, yet it violates Title VII. Racial slurs, though intentional
and directed at individuals, may still be just verbal insults, yet they too may
create Title VII liability. How then can sexual harassment, which injects the
most demeaning sexual stereotypes into the general work environment and
which always represents an intentional assault on an individual's innermost pri-
vacy, not be illegal?
Bundy, 641 F.2d at 945. It is also interesting to note that the D.C. Circuit Court was one
of the first to recognize a quid pro quo claim of sexual harassment. See Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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may state a valid cause of action under Title VII if she has suffered psy-
chological and emotional injuries, regardless of whether she has also sus-
tained actual economic injury."
The Supreme Court upheld the D.C. Circuit's reversal of the lower
court, expressly agreeing that the case should be remanded for considera-
tion under a "hostile environment" theory. The Supreme Court held,
however, that the focus on remand should be on the "unwelcomeness" of
the conduct and not on the "voluntariness" of the victim's participa-
tion. 6 Significantly, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that
Title VII protects only those victims who have suffered economic injury,
pointing out that "Title VII affords employees the right to work in an
environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult"
whether based on sex, race, religion or national origin." The Court fur-
ther held that a plaintiff establishes a cause of action for sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII "by proving that discrimination based on sex has
created a hostile or abusive work environment."5 8
In identifying the requirements for a valid claim under Title VII, the
Supreme Court cautioned that not all harassment affects a "term, condi-
tion, or privilege" of employment within the meaning of Title VII. For
example, the "'mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which en-
genders offensive feelings in an employee'" is not by itself actionable
under Title VII. 9 Instead, to state a claim under Title VII, sexual har-
assment "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions
55. In Bundy, the Court of Appeals had agreed with the plaintiff's claim that "condi-
tions of employment" include the psychological and emotional work environment, i.e.,
"that the sexually stereotyped insults and demeaning propositions to which she was indis-
putably subjected and which caused her anxiety and debilitation... invokes" a cause of
action under Title VII. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 944.
In Vinson, the Court of Appeals further held that a victim's "voluntary" submission to
unlawful discriminatory acts had no bearing on the relevant inquiry: whether such toler-
ation was a condition of Vinson's employment. See Vinson, 753 F.2d at 146. The court
also found that the employer is absolutely liable for sexual harassment committed by its
supervisory employees whether it knew or could have known of such conduct and
whether, had the bank known of such conduct, it would have disapproved and stopped it.
See id at 147.
56. The Court concluded that the issue of "unwelcomeness" is at the center of Title
VII claims, since "[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged
sexual advances were 'unwelcome.'" Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68
(1986).
57. Id. at 65.
58. Meitor, 477 U.S. at 66. In explaining its rationale, the Court quoted from the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982):
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for mem-
bers of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the work-
place that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a
man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being
allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as
the harshest of racial epithets.
Mefitor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 902).
59. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
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of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.' "" In determining the severity or pervasiveness of the conduct,
the Court directed triers of fact to look to "'the totality of circum-
stances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in
which the alleged incidents occurred.' "61
In Meritor, the Supreme Court also acknowledged, for the first time,
the elements needed to support a hostile environment claim in a sexual
discrimination case. Specifically, the Court concluded that the trier of
fact62 must find that:
1. the employee is a member of a protected group;
2. the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment;
3. the harassment complained of was based upon sex;
4. the harassment complained of affected a "term, condition, or privi-
lege of employment"; and
5. the employer, under the doctrine of respondeat superior,63 knew
60. Id. (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904) (alterations in original). Note, however,
that while the Supreme Court stated here that the harassment must be both "sufficiently
severe.., and create an abusive working environment," id. (emphasis added), the EEOC
Guidelines state only that the harassment must "unreasonably interfer[e] with an individ-
ual's work performance or creat[e] an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ-
ment." EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, § 1604.11(a)(3) (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court drew its more limiting construction from the Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Rogers v. EEOC, the first case to adopt a "hostile environment" analysis in a matter
involving racial discrimination. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). At least one court has asserted that there is no inconsistency
between the EEOC's wording and the Supreme Court's interpretation in Meritor. See
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 1991). In contrast, at least one commenta-
tor has argued that the Supreme Court specifically intended to adopt the stricter standard
of Rogers rather than the more lenient construction set forth in the EEOC guidelines. See
Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 Harv.
Women's L.J. 35, 60 (1990).
61. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (quoting EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, at
§ 1604.1 l(b)).
62. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there was no provision for a jury trial. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, provides for a jury trial in cases involving intentional
discrimination in which the plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages. See
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (1991) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 198 la). The introduction of jury trials and the expansion of dam-
ages available under Title VII are two of the most significant aspects of the new Act. The
addition of these provisions fundamentally changes the legal model underlying federal
discrimination laws. The new Act, in providing for expanded money damages, moves
these causes of action away from a format in which the goal is conciliation and improve-
ment of employer-employee relations and toward the more adversarial format of a civil
trial for tort damages. See Committee on Continuing Professional Educ., ALI-ABA, The
Civil Rights Act of 1991, at 22 (1992) (compilation of materials addressing the 1991 Civil
Rights Act amendments).
63. Although the Supreme Court used the term "respondeat superior," this element,
as it has been interpreted, more accurately reflects a negligence standard for employer
liability that essentially restates the "fellow-servant" rule. See Hirschfield v. New Mexico
Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 577 n.5 (10th Cir. 1990); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015-




or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to
take prompt remedial action.
64
With these guidelines in mind, it is necessary to explore, as the next
step in our analysis, just how courts have determined what constitutes
"unwelcomeness," which activities are "based on sex," and what sorts of
harassment "affect the terms and conditions" of employment, since it is
these issues that courts must choose to interpret through the eyes of a
reasonable person,65 the victim and the reasonable person, 66 or a reason-
able woman67 in evaluating a hostile environment cause of action.
1. Was the Behavior "Unwelcome?"
In Meritor, the Supreme Court made clear that the issue of "un-
welcomeness" is at the center of Title VII claims, stating that "[t]he gra-
vamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances
were 'unwelcome.' "68 This finding essentially supported the approach
adopted in the EEOC Guidelines, which define sexual harassment as
"unwelcome... verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. ' 69 In
addition, the fact that sexual attraction plays a role in the day-to-day
social exchange between employees means that "the distinction between
invited, uninvited-but-welcome, offensive-but-tolerated and flatly re-
jected" sexual advances may well be difficult to discern."
64. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-69 (1986). These elements were first set forth in Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982). Cases in which the courts have
expressly employed these standards include: Hall, 842 F.2d at 1013 (8th Cir. 1988);
Swentek v. USAIR, Inc. 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793
F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987);
and Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525, 527-28 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
Other courts, however, have chosen to adopt other elements. For example, in Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990), the Third Circuit held that
five constituents must converge to bring a successful claim for a sexually hostile
work environment under Title VII: (1) the employees suffered intentional dis-
crimination because of their sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regu-
lar, (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the
discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in
that position; (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.
Id at 1482 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In requiring that the discrimination be
intentional, the court stated:
The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual proposi-
tions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual derogatory language is im-
plicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of course. A more fact
intensive analysis will be necessary when the actions are not sexual by their very
nature.
Id at 1482 n.3.
65. For cases that have adopted this standard, see supra note 20.
66. For cases that have adopted this standard, see supra note 21.
67. For cases that have adopted this standard, see supra note 23.
68. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
69. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, § 1604.11(a).




Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Mertor, the Eleventh Circuit
had provided a general definition of "unwelcome conduct" in Henson v.
City of Dundee: the challenged conduct "must be unwelcome in the
sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that
the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive."71 In ad-
dition, the EEOC Guidelines direct that, when confronted with conflict-
ing evidence as to whether the acts were welcome, the fact finder should
consider "the record as a whole and the totality of the circumstances."72
If there is a question about the credibility of the parties, or there is some
suggestion of "welcomeness," the EEOC suggests that the plaintiff's case
will be viewed as being considerably stronger if she has made a contem-
poraneous protest or complaint, although the fact that she made a be-
lated complaint should also be taken into consideration.73 Evidence of a
contemporaneous complaint is especially critical in those cases in which
the defendant might have had reason to believe that his advances were
welcome due to a prior consensual relationship with the plaintiff.74
In Meritor, the Supreme Court directed lower courts to determine
"whether [the employee] by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual
advances were unwelcome."75 In their efforts to apply this standard, a
number of courts have considered whether the plaintiff herself has a his-
tory of using sexually-oriented language, making sexual advances, or en-
gaging in sexual horseplay in the workplace. According to these courts,
the plaintiff's involvement in these activities will generally bar a cause of
action for sexual harassment under the premise that this behavior indi-
cates that the defendant may have legitimately perceived his allegedly
harassing conduct as welcome.76 Further, the fact that the plaintiff
71. 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
72. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, at § 1604.11(b).
73. See Policy Guidance on Current Issues, supra note 6, at 95.
74. See id. Perhaps the most difficult cases are those in which the harassment is pre-
ceded by the termination of a romantic relationship. For example, in Shrout v. Black
Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ohio 1988), the plaintiff brought a sexual harass-
ment cause of action against her supervisor with whom she had terminated a consensual
affair. See id. at 779. After the affair ended, the supervisor subjected her to unwelcome
and degrading sexual remarks, touched her in an offensive manner, and withheld job
benefits from her. The supervisor also refused to provide performance appraisals for her.
The court found both "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" types of harassment
despite the fact that the plaintiff had not complained to anyone except her supervisor.
Explaining its reasoning, the court pointed out that the company had no policy concern-
ing hostile environment and that the plaintiff justifiably feared that the company would
not believe her if she did complain and that she might be subject to retaliation. See id. at
780-81.
75. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
76. See, e.g., Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1500-01 (W.D.
Mo. 1989) (action barred because plaintiff was an active, encouraging participant in sexu-
ally explicit conversations and actions); McLean v. Satellite Technology Servs., Inc., 673
F. Supp. 1458, 1459 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (sexual advances were not unwelcome where
"plaintiff was anything but demure [and] she possessed a lusty libido and was no paragon
of virtue" and where she often displayed her body at work through photographs of her-
self and raising her clothes); Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587, 599 (W.D. Mich. 1986)
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stopped her involvement in these activities prior to the incident or inci-
dents at issue is not necessarily enough to negate this presumption. For
example, in Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian,77 the plaintiff alleged that
her refusal to continue engaging in the use of vulgar language, sexual
jokes in the office, and sexual banter established that the conduct was
unwelcome. The court denied her harassment claim, however, finding
that once a plaintiff has participated in such activities, she must go fur-
ther than mere abstinence and actively indicate that she now finds such
conduct unwelcome. 8 Other courts have denied the plaintiff's claim
where the plaintiff has engaged in explicit sexual conversations and ban-
tering.79 Still other courts have denied the plaintiff's cause of action
where the plaintiff issued invitations to the alleged harasser to meet
outside the office for dinner or drinks and the harassment took place
during these occasions.8
A number of courts have also had to deal with the issue of "welcome-
ness" in the context of cases in which the plaintiff has brought a claim for
harassment based on conduct that occurred after the plaintiff had volun-
tarily engaged in a sexual relationship with the defendant. The question
of whether courts can even entertain a harassment claim under these cir-
cumstances was resolved in Meritor, where the Supreme Court stated
that "voluntary" submission to sexual conduct will not necessarily de-
feat a claim for subsequent sexual harassment."' This holding makes
(plaintiff's participation in office horseplay, sexual joking and vulgarity undermined her
claim for a hostile environment); Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., Inc., 560
F. Supp. 1172, 1196 (D. Del. 1986) (sexually aggressive conduct and explicit conversa-
tions on the part of the plaintiff may bar a cause of action for hostile environment). But
see Swentek v. USAIR, Inc. 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff's use of foul
language or sexual innuendo in a consensual setting does not waive her legal protection
against unwelcome harassment).
77. 633 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 (S.D. Miss. 1986), aff'd, 824 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988).
78. See id at 1326-27.
79. See, eg., Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639, 641
(E.D. Mo. 1982) (plaintiff regularly engaged in sexually-oriented conversations, used vul-
gar language and discussed her own sexual encounters; court thus rejected her claim of
hostile environment, finding that sexual remarks or propositions by co-workers were the
result of her sexual aggressiveness).
80. See, e-g., Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir.
1986) (plaintiff failed to establish a case in part due to the fact that the harassment was
induced by her suggestion that the defendant join her at a bar to discuss a promotion);
Sardigal v. St. Louis Nat'l Stockyards, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 497 (S.D. Ill.
1986) (plaintiff's claim barred by the fact that she visited the harasser outside work and
invited him to her house after the alleged harassment took place); Reichman v. Bureau of
Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149, 1177 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (plaintiff's case denied
where she flirted with the defendant and asked him on several occasions to her house to
dinner despite his refusals).
81. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986); see also Westmoreland
Coal Co. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 1989) (re-
versing lower court's finding that the relationship was voluntary and therefore not "un-
welcome" on grounds that the plaintiff's agreement to submit came only after threats by
the harasser to fire her).
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sense, particularly considering the fact that the power imbalance between
the employer and the employee can make the whole notion of voluntari-
ness highly questionable. Thus, in one case, evidence that the plaintiff
stayed in the room and failed to protest her superior's advances did not
defeat her cause of action for hostile environment sexual harassment. 82
In assessing whether the conduct was in fact unwelcome, the EEOC
and the courts generally prefer to rely on objective behavior rather than
the plaintiff's unexpressed or uncommunicated feelings.8 3 In one case,
for example, the plaintiff offered as evidence entries in her personal diary
indicating that the sexual banter of the defendant was unwelcome.84 The
court ruled against her claim, however, relying instead on evidence that,
at work, the plaintiff had not objected to the defendant's behavior and
had in fact "demonstrated every willingness to at least condone, if not
participate in"8 5 the language and conduct at issue.
2. Was the Behavior "Based on Sex?"
The second Meritor element required to establish a cause of action for
hostile environment harassment asks whether the behavior at issue was
"based on sex." 86 The primary inquiry here is whether "but for the fact
of her sex, [the plaintiff] would not have been the object of harass-
ment."8" A number of courts and commentators have noted that if the
complained-of sexual conduct proves offensive to both males and fe-
males, then it may not give rise to a cause of action for sexual harassment
because both men and women were accorded like treatment. 8
As one commentator has noted, those cases that consider whether the
defendant's conduct was in fact based on sex fill the air "with a tense
combination of lust and contempt."8 9 The most obvious cases that sat-
isfy the "based on sex" criterion are those in which the plaintiff is sub-
jected to express sexual advances9 ° or intentional touching of intimate
body parts.9 1 But courts have also recognized other, more subtle behav-
82. See Rudow v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, 474 N.Y.S.2d 1005,
1008, aff'd, 487 N.Y.S.2d 453 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 489 N.E.2d 1302 (N.Y.
1985).
83. See EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, § 1604.11.
84. See Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315
(D.N.J. 1983).
85. Id. at 1321.
86. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-69 (1986).
87. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
88. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620; Henson, 682 F.2d at 620; Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bradford v. Sloan Paper Co., 383 F. Supp. 1157,
1161 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation for the
Elimination of Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1007,
1020-21 n.99, 1033 n.178 (1978); Comment, Employment Discrimination-Sexual Har-
assment and Title VII, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 148, 151-52 (1976).
89. Alba Conte, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace 86 (1990).
90. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
91. The EEOC distinguishes between verbal and physical conduct:
The Commission will presume that the unwelcome, intentional touching of a
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ior as being "based on sex." 92 One such category includes harassing be-
havior that does not necessarily involve sexually explicit conduct or
content,93 but that is directed exclusively or primarily at females and that
is motivated by animus against women.'
One case that illustrates this "animus" category is Lipsett v. University
of Puerto Rico,95 a 1988 First Circuit decision in which a medical resi-
dent of a university hospital alleged sexual harassment based on extreme
animus displayed by certain doctors toward her and other female resi-
dents. Evidence of this animus by the male doctors in charge of the pro-
gram included the constant disparagement of the women residents, the
fact that few women were admitted to the program, the deficiencies in
the facilities provided to the women that were admitted relative to those
provided to male residents, the chief resident's public declaration to the
plaintiff and to other residents of his desire to eliminate all female resi-
dents through a "regime of terror," and statements by the chief resident
that he intended to "run the plaintiff off" unless she behaved more doc-
ilely and that women generally should not go into surgery. 96 The plain-
tiff alleged, and the court agreed, that she was harassed by both the chief
of the program as well as by the male residents, and that she was dis-
charged from the program because of her sex.9 7
Another case illustrative of the animus category is Delgado v. Leh-
charging party's intimate body areas is sufficiently offensive to alter the condi-
tions of her working environment and constitute a violation of Tile VII. More
so than in the case of verbal advances or remarks, a single unwelcome physical
advance can seriously poison the victim's working environment.
Policy Guidance on Current Issues, supra note 6, at 105.
92. One of the first courts to recognize a more subtle form of sexual harassment was
the D.C. Circuit, which considered whether physically aggressive acts by a male supervi-
sor against a female employee could give rise to a hostile environment claim even though
the acts were not of a sexual nature. The court stated:
We have never held that sexual harassment or other unequal treatment of an
employee or group of employees that occurs because of the sex of the employee
must, to be illegal under Title VII, take the form of sexual advances or of other
incidents with clearly sexual overtones. And we decline to do so now. Rather,
we hold that any harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or
group of employees that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or
employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condi-
tion of employment under Title VII.
McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
93. In recent years, courts have made it clear that offensive verbal or physical conduct
need not be obviously sexual in nature to give rise to a cause of action for sexual harass-
ment. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); McKinney v.
Dole, 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Thompson v. Arkansas Transp. Dep't., 691 F.
Supp. 1201 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1987).
94. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990)("[O]ffensive conduct is not necessarily required to include sexual overtones in every
instance.").
95. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
96. See id. at 887-88.
97. See id at 895.
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man.98 The male supervisor in this case consistently demeaned women
by referring to them as "babes," repeatedly used the term "women" in a
derogatory manner, constantly interrupted women in conversations, and
provided women with little professional guidance. In addition, a number
of the supervisor's female subordinates allegedly sought and secured
transfers because he publicly berated them and demeaned them. The
court concluded that these activities formed the basis of an actionable
hostile environment cause of action.
There is also another category of "based on sex" cases: those cases
that involve behavior disproportionately more offensive or demeaning to
women than to men even though it may not necessarily be directed at
specific female employees, and that does not necessarily involve animus
toward women. These cases typically involve allegations of sexual horse-
play at the office, including displays of sexually explicit materials such as
photographs,9 9 literature,10° cartoons,10 1 or calendars.10 2  This category
also encompasses cases involving the use of vulgarities and profane lan-
guage in the workplace. 103 In general, such behavior is seen as creating
an "atmosphere" that raises "barrier[s] to the progress of women in the
workplace because it conveys the message that they do not belong, that
they are welcome in the workplace only if they will subvert their identi-
ties to the sexual stereotypes prevalent in that environment.' 04 This
98. 665 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1987). This and other animus cases indicate that
actionable sexual harassment need not involve overt sexual advances or innuendo, but
may be based on verbal abuse directed at women that is sufficiently patterned to affect a
condition of employment, is directed at the plaintiff and others because of their sex, and is
coupled with hostile acts, intimidation, or unequal treatment of women. See Hicks v.
Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
99. See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988); Arnold v. City
of Seminole, 614 F. Supp. 853, 856 (E.D. Okla. 1985); Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1627, 1629 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
100. See Ross v. Twenty-Four Collection, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1547, 1549-50 (S.D. Fla.
1988); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 571 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
101. See Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1020 (1989); Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1987).
102. See, e.g., Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
103. See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1017-18 (8th Cir. 1988); Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 899
(11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Barbetta v.
Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 571 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Spencer v. General
Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204, 213 (E.D. Va. 1988). The EEOC has suggested, in cases in
which the alleged sexual harassment consists of verbal conduct, the questions to be ex-
plored by the trier of fact should include the following:
- Did the alleged harasser single out the charging party?
- Did the charging party participate?
- What was relationship between the charging party and the alleged
harasser(s)?
- Were the remarks hostile and derogatory?
Policy Guidance on Current Issues, supra note 6, at 105.
104. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
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type of conduct is most likely to constitute a cause of action for hostile
environment harassment if there is evidence of a strong pattern showing
that the behavior was directed at plaintiff because of her sex-' and that
the behavior affects a condition of employment. Of course, such cases
are made stronger if they, are coupled with evidence of overt sexual
advances.
One example of a case that falls into the "sexual horseplay" category is
Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach."°s In Sanchez, the court found a hostile
work environment based on evidence that the plaintiff, a police officer,
was exposed to a barrage of graffiti, posters, and pin-ups that were placed
throughout her place of employment and that targeted her specifically.
The plaintiff was also the butt of sexual pranks including the receipt of
moaning, sighing, and kissing noises over the police radio. In another
case within this category, sexual harassment was found where the de-
fendant gave the plaintiff a pornographic magazine, left an article on her
desk regarding a "seminar on extra-marital affairs without guilt," and
made explicit sexual advances on several occasions. 107
The much criticized Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,1°8 a Sixth Cir-
cuit case, also falls into the "sexual horseplay" category. The plaintiff in
Rabidue alleged that she was discharged because of her sex. She based
her charge of a hostile environment on the vulgar and obscene comments
made regularly by her supervisor concerning women generally and occa-
sionally the plaintiff specifically, and the display by employees of pictures
of nude or scantily clad women in their offices and in common work
areas. 9 Here, however, the court found that the plaintiff had not stated
a valid cause of action because sex-related humor and vulgar jokes
abound in certain work environments, and because "'Title VII was not
meant to-or can-change this.' "110 The court further held that the
obscenities were "not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches
of the plaintiff or other female employees."'' This logic 112 has been
harshly criticized in a number of circuit court opinions, including other
105. In most hostile environment cases, it is not difficult to prove that the hostile acts
of a defendant were directed at a plaintiff because of her sex. This is not always the case,
however. For example, one case in which a court found that the harassment was not
directed at the plaintiff because of his sex dealt with a plaintiff who was a jilted lover.
The court determined that the female supervisor harassed the employee not because he
was a male, but because he had spurned her. Thus, the defendant's actions were the
result of a personal vendetta and not sexually discriminatory. See Huebschen v. Depart-
ment of Health & Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1169-71 (7th Cir. 1983).
106. 720 F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
107. See Ross v. Twenty-Four Collection, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1547, 1551 (S.D. Fla.
1988).
108. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
109. See id. at 615.
110. Id at 621 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419,430 (E.D.
Mich. 1984)).
111. Id at 622.




Sixth Circuit opinions. 1 '
Yet another case that illustrates this category is Robinson v. Jackson-
ville Shipyards.1 14 In Robinson, the plaintiff was a female welder in a
shipyard, historically a predominately male work environment. She
brought a successful claim for hostile environment based on the male
workers' practices of posting pin-ups of nude women in their lockers and
in common areas as well as their use of obscene language.
Although at least one district court has read the EEOC Guidelines as
requiring evidence of explicit sexual harassment before a hostile environ-
ment claim becomes actionable, I" Meritor seems to make it clear that, in
the Supreme Court's view, a hostile environment cause of action is not
restricted to instances in which there have been intimidation and ridicule
of an explicitly sexual nature." 6 As evidenced by the cases discussed in
this section, hostility toward women because they are women can be
manifested in nonsexual ways and can give rise to a cause of action re-
gardless of whether it is coupled with sexual conduct claims. Clearly, the
persistent use of obscene language and the display of pornography in the
workplace are as likely to be regarded as offensive to women who seek to
work in an environment "with professional dignity and without the bar-
rier of sexual differentiation and abuse""' as are explicitly sexual con-
duct and propositions.
3. Conduct That Is Sufficiently Severe and Pervasive
The third and critical Meritor element required to establish a cause of
action for hostile environment sexual harassment is that the conduct be
"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment.' ''118 The issue
here is whether the workplace atmosphere has become so suffused with
hostility toward members of one sex that it alters the conditions of em-
ployment for the group.' 9 In essence, an employee is forced to "'run a
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to
work and make a living.' "120 Not all conduct that may be characterized
113. The following Sixth Circuit opinions have criticized Rabidue: Davis v. Monsanto
Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989), and
Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1987). Other circuit court opinions
critical of Rabidue include Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 1991) and An-
drews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990).
114. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
115. See Kelsey-Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 713 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1989),
aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
116. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1986).
117. Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988), cert denied,
489 U.S. 1020 (1989).
118. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dun-
dee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1lth Cir. 1982)).
119. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (lst Cir. 1988).




as harassing rises to the level of actionable harassment, however. Rather,
it is a matter of evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of the con-
duct--"the totality of the circumstances" in light of "the record as a
whole." '2 Both the EEOC and the courts have worked to establish a
line, albeit more fuzzy than bright, demarcating acceptable from unac-
ceptable behavior. As the discussion that follows indicates, with a few
blatant exceptions,"2 the courts and the EEOC generally seem to agree
on what constitutes a hostile environment.
The EEOC cites six factors to consider in reaching a "hostile environ-
ment" determination:
1. whether the conduct was verbal or physical, or both;
2. how frequently it was repeated;
3. whether the conduct was hostile and patently offensive;
4. whether the alleged harasser was a co-worker or a supervisor,
5. whether others joined in perpetrating the harassment; and
6. whether the harassment was directed at more than one
individual. 
12 3
To determine whether unwelcome sexual harassment rises to the level
of actionable sexual harassment, the threshold inquiry is whether the
conduct "unreasonably interfer[es] with an individual's work perform-
ance" or creates "an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ-
ment." 12 4 Applying this test, the EEOC suggests that sexual flirtation,
innuendo, or even vulgar language that is trivial or simply annoying is
not generally sufficient to establish a hostile environment. 1" Further,
the EEOC states, and most courts have agreed, that isolated instances of
offensive sexual conduct or remarks generally do not satisfy the test.
2 6
121. Id. at 69. The following material is taken from the EEOC Guidelines on Discrim-
ination Because of Sex:
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the
Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circum-
stances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the
alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular ac-
tion will be made from the facts on a case by case basis.
EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, § 1604.11(b).
122. See, eg., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a workplace permeated with sexually offensive posters and language was the norm
and that women should not be offended), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
123. Policy Guidance on Current Issues, supra note 6, at 102.
124. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, § 1604.11(a).
125. See Policy Guidance on Current Issues, supra note 6, at 102. These are the types
of behavior that many feminists insist are not taken seriously enough by the courts. See
infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
126. See Policy Guidance on Current Issues, supra note 6, at 103. As the Supreme
Court noted in Meritor, "'mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders
offensive feelings in an employee' would not affect the conditions of employment to (a]
sufficiently significant degree to violate Title VII." Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454
F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (en bane), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)); accord Car-
rero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1989); Snell v. Suffolk
County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1987); Danna v. New York Tel. Co., 752 F. Supp.
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A single, particularly severe incident of sexual harassment may satisfy
the test, however, if it involves unwelcome, intentional touching of the
victim's intimate body parts. According to the EEOC, "[m]ore so than
in the case of verbal advances or remarks, a single unwelcome physical
advance can seriously poison the victim's working environment." '127
Furthermore, if the victim is subjected to both physical non-intimate and
verbal harassment, and/or there is evidence that the sexual harassment is
directed at other employees as well, the hostile environment require-
ments are usually met. 128 The courts and the EEOC generally agree that
a hostile environment claim requires a pattern of offensive behavior and
that the totality of circumstances should be examined to determine
whether the environment was sufficiently hostile. 129
Courts have had ample opportunity to determine which types and pat-
terns of workplace harassment rise to the level of actionable harassment.
The conduct at issue in cases tried to date runs the gamut from sexual
remarks and propositions and the display of pornographic pictures and
sexually explicit caricatures of plaintiffs, to verbal threats and actual
physical assaults. As indicated earlier, unless the behavior is extreme
and involves physical assault, the courts usually require that the offensive
behavior be established through a series of events or a persistent pattern
of behavior.
Courts appear to concur on at least one type of case-those cases that
involve offensive sexual physical conduct in conjunction with other offen-
sive behavior (e.g., making lewd and offensive inquiries of the plaintiff
594 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Christoforou v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 294, 301
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Neville v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1314
(W.D.N.Y. 1987); Volk v. Coler, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1111 (C.D. Ill. 1986);
Freedman v. American Standard, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 471 (D.N.J. 1986).
127. Policy Guidance on Current Issues, supra note 6, at 105; see also Gilardi v.
Schroeder, 672 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (plaintiff drugged by employer and raped,
then fired at the insistence of the employer's wife); Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 584 F.
Supp. 22 (D. Neb. 1983), aff'd, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff subjected to offen-
sive touching and sexual comments in a moving vehicle).
128. See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987).
129. See Policy Guidance on Current Issues, supra note 6, at 103; see also King v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990)
("Although a single act can be enough... generally, repeated incidents create a stronger
claim of hostile environment, with the strength of the claim depending on the number of
incidents and the intensity of each incident.") (citations omitted); accord Andrews v. City
of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990) (fact finder must not only look to the
frequency of the incidents but to their severity as well); Carrero v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989) (it is not how long the offending conduct lasts
but the offensiveness of the individual actions); Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
863 F.2d 1503, 1510-11 (1lth Cir. 1989) (factfinder must evaluate frequency as well as
gravity; suit does not turn on number of incidents alone); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck and
Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1986) (many instances of offensive conduct but none
rose to poisonous level); Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986)
(pattern required; harassment must be sustained and non-trivial); Downes v. Federal Avi-




and other female employees, displaying obscene materials, etc.). Most
courts seem to acknowledge that these kinds of acts, or a combination of
them, rise to the level of a "hostile work environment" if carried out over
a sufficiently prolonged period of time.' 30
But the courts have not reached consensus or applied consistent stan-
dards13 1 to another type of case-those that deal with the display of sex-
ually explicit pictures in the workplace coupled with the making of
sexual remarks and sexual propositions.1 32 In Rabidue v. Osceola Refin-
ing Co.,133 for example, the basis of the plaintiff's complaint was two-
fold: being subjected to a particular employee's extreme vulgarity and
obscenities, and the occasional display of pictures of nude or scantily clad
women by other employees in their offices or in common work areas.
Allegedly fired for her irascible and opinionated personality and her in-
ability to work in harmony with co-workers,13 1 the plaintiff subsequently
filed a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment with the EEOC,
which denied her claim. She then sued in federal district court.
The district court acknowledged that it had not previously addressed a
cause of action asserting a violation of Title VII based on a claim of
hostile environment and observed that, "[u]nlike the facts [of the cases
reviewed], this case involved no sexual propositions, offensive touchings,
or sexual conduct of a similar nature that was systematically directed to
130. See, eg., Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989) (evidence that
supervisor made several attempts to kiss and fondle an employee coupled with sexually
suggestive remarks was sufficient to defeat a claim for summary judgment); Waltman v.
International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1989) (evidence that several employees
touched plaintiff in a sexually offensive manner and addressed sexual comments to her-
along with evidence of on-going sexual graffiti on walls, elevators, and bathrooms-estab-
lished a hostile environment); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988)
(verbal sexual abuse against female traffic controllers combined with offensive touching of
plaintiff's thighs and breast created a hostile environment); EEOC v. Gurnee Inn Corp.,
48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 871 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (manager who made sexual com-
ments to female employees, touched them in a sexual manner, attempted to force himself
physically on them, and gave preferential treatment to those who acquiesced was guilty of
sexual harassment); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569 (W.D.N.Y.
1987) (display of pornography in the workplace, vulgar comments by supervisors and co-
workers, physical contact of a sexual nature, and requirements that women wear skirts to
please visiting supervisor may constitute sexual harassment).
131. Compare, eg., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)
(appropriate standard by which alleged offensive behavior should be judged is that of the
reasonable person) with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (n evaluating the
severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, focus should be on the perspective of the
reasonable woman).
132. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Carrero v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); Waltman v. International
Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1989); Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Ind., 799 F.2d
1180 (7th Cir. 1986); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1119 (N.D. I. 1987);
Salazar v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 472 (S.D. Tex.
1987).
133. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
134. See id. at 615.
1993]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the plaintiff over a protracted period of time." ' 5 Evidently reluctant to
expand the horizons of a hostile environment claim beyond those already
established, the Sixth Circuit turned a deaf ear to Ms. Rabidue's allega-
tions, stating:
In the case at bar, the record effectively disclosed that [Mr.] Henry's
obscenities, although annoying, were not so startling as to have af-
fected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff or other female employ-
ees.... The sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect
on the plaintiff's work environment when considered in the context of
a society that condones and publicly features and commercially ex-
ploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands,
on prime-time television, at the cinema and on other public places. In
sum, Henry's vulgar language, coupled with the sexually oriented pos-
ters, did not result in a working environment that could be considered
intimidating, hostile, or offensive under 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) as
elaborated upon by this court. 136
A number of courts have strongly disagreed with Rabidue's narrow
interpretation of Title VII,137 however, finding hostile environments
under similar facts.1 31 In the previously discussed case of Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 39 for example, a federal district court in
Florida addressed the issue of pornographic pictures and pin-ups in the
workplace. In this case, the primary basis of the plaintiff's complaint
was the posting of pictures depicting nude or partially nude women
throughout the shipyard where she worked, combined with pervasive
sexual comments by her male coworkers. The plaintiff was able to point
out numerous examples of pornographic posters and photographs for the
court, one of which depicted a nude female torso with the words "USDA
Choice" written across it.14° The court found that the working environ-
ment at the shipyard was abusive in light of the totality of the circum-
stances, circumstances that included the constant remarks and jokes of a
sexual nature, the sexually oriented pictures of women posted through-
out the workplace, and the isolation of women by male co-workers. 141
In its opinion, the district court explicitly rejected the Rabidue holding
135. Id. at 622 n.7.
136. Id. at 622.
137. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We do not agree
with the standards set forth in ... Rabidue, and we choose not to follow [that deci-
sion]."); Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988) (Sixth Circuit criti-
cizes Rabidue's narrow reading of Title VII), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989).
138. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding that pornographic pictures of women may serve as evidence of a hostile environ-
ment); Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974, 977 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (holding
that "a plethora of sexually offensive posters, pictures, graffiti, and pinups placed on the
walls throughout the Police Department" and "innumerable childish, yet offensive, sex-
ual and obscene innuendoes and incidents aimed at [the plaintiff] on the basis of sex" give
rise to a hostile environment cause of action).
139. 760 F. Supp 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
140. See id. at 1495.
141. See id. at 1524-25.
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that "'a proper assessment or evaluation of an employment environ-
ment'... includes 'the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environ-
ment of the workplace both before and after the plaintiff's introduction
into its environs, coupled with the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff
on voluntarily entering into that environment.' "142 Instead, the district
court specifically stated that "the social milieu of the area and the work-
place does not diminish the harassing impact" '143 of the offensive
conduct.
Although the prevalence of pornographic photographs in the work-
place was greater in Robinson than in Rabidue, it seems apparent that
many courts believe that women should not have to be exposed to any
such displays in the workplace. As stated by the court in Andrews v. City
of Philadelphia, "[o]bscene language and pornography quite possibly
could be regarded as 'highly offensive to a woman who seeks to deal with
her fellow employees and clients with professional dignity and without
the barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse.' ,,u
A number of courts have determined that a hostile environment can
also be created by certain non-sexual conduct. In these cases, the courts
have held that threats, intimidations, insults, and verbal abuse directed at
women can satisfy the "severe and pervasive" test.' 45 For the most part,
courts that have failed to find a hostile environment where these elements
were present have reasoned that the incidents were isolated and lacking
in repetitive effect. For example, in Jones v. Flagship International,'46 the
plaintiff was propositioned by her supervisor on several business trips
and was offended by a display of bare-chested mermaid centerpieces at a
company function. The Fifth Circuit found that these events were not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile environment. Fur-
ther, the court suggested that a hostile environment cause of action in
which the plaintiff cannot show a tangible lost job benefit requires a
higher showing that the conduct was severe and pervasive. 47
142. IdL at 1525 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.
1986)).
143. Id (citing Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1359 n.2 (11th Cir. 1982)).
144. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting
Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1020 (1989)). It is interesting to note that the Andrews court couches its opinion as
to what women find sexually offensive with the words "quite possibly," as if the court is
not really sure what women in general would think. According to some scholars, there
should be no need for such hesitation in cases in which courts adopt the "reasonable
woman" standard of review, since it is clear that obscene language and pornography in
the workplace are offensive to the reasonable woman. For a discussion of the reasonable
woman standard, see infra notes 154-74 and accompanying text.
145. See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988); Lipsett v. University
of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406
(10th Cir. 1987); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Delgado v. Leh-
man, 665 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1987).
146. 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987).
147. See ia at 720-22. Other cases dealing with conduct that courts considered too
isolated or lacking in repetitive effect to sustain a cause of action under Title VII include
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Along similar lines, the Seventh Circuit found the conduct at issue in
Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 48 to be "too isolated and lacking the repet-
itive and debilitating effect" necessary to sustain a claim for hostile envi-
ronment. 149 In Scott, a co-worker of the plaintiff had invited her to join
him at a restaurant after work and suggested that he give her a rub down.
In addition, another co-worker had slapped her on the buttocks, and an-
other had made lewd comments about her.150 In other cases, unjust criti-
cisms coupled with one lewd comment15 ' and requests for sexual favors
by a co-worker on several occasions over a four month period were each
held not sufficiently repetitive to meet the burden of proving a hostile
work environment.15
2
II. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CASES: EVOLUTION OF THE
"REASONABLE WOMAN" STANDARD
Even assuming that courts can agree on the types and patterns of con-
duct that establish a hostile environment cause of action, a fundamental
issue remains: by what standard should the allegedly harassing acts be
judged? In cases to date, courts have applied a variety of standards to
determine whether the conduct at issue was "unwelcome" and "suffi-
ciently severe and pervasive."' 5 For example, as mentioned in the intro-
duction, some courts have applied the traditional "reasonable person"
standard.15 4 Other courts have modified the "reasonable person" stan-
dard by using a two-step objective (what would the reasonable person
Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988) (posting of obscene
cartoons of the plaintiff in men's room for a week were "meager proof" of actionable
hostile environment), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989), and Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1181-82 (D. Del. 1983) (where manager slapped plain-
tiff's rear, invited her in for a "heart to breast" talk, referred to her as his girlfriend in
front of other workers, inquired into her sexual proclivities, and made other comments of
a sexual nature, acts were not sufficient to constitute sexual harassment given plaintiff's
statement that the alleged harasser may not have intended or perceived his conduct as
offensive).
148. 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
149. Id. at 214.
150. See id. at 211-12.
151. See Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 856 F.2d
184 (3d Cir. 1988).
152. See Hollis v. Fleetguard, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 631 (M.D. Tenn. 1987), aff'd, 848
F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Neville v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 42 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1314 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (fact that, on several occasions, plaintiff's supervisor
grabbed, kissed and pressed his body against plaintiff did not constitute a hostile environ-
ment); Freedman v. American Standard, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 471 (D.N.J.
1986) (co-worker's one obscene phone call, invitation for a date and rudeness were not
sufficient to constitute a hostile environment); Volk v. Coler, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1111 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (occasional use of foul language or gestures by a supervisor
insufficient to support a cause of action for hostile environment, since not every instance
of bad judgment on the part of a supervisor is actionable).
153. See supra notes 68-85, 118-52 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 20 for cases adopting the reasonable person standard.
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think?) and subjective (what did this particular victim think?) ap-
proach.1'5 Still another court recommends judging the behavior from
the perspective of both the perpetrator and the victim. 156 And yet an-
other court has suggested that, under certain circumstances, the perspec-
tive of the defendant alone should be the focus of inquiry.157
Recently, the Ninth Circuit adopted a different, more controversial ap-
proach: viewing sexual harassment grievances from the perspective of
the reasonable woman.158 This Section will examine the evolution of this
standard and how it is being applied by an increasing number of courts.
The next Section will look at the legal, social, and ethical implications of
adopting such a standard on a widespread scale.
The adoption of a distinct standard for women is not novel. In past
years, a form of the reasonable woman standard has been adopted in
certain intentional torts cases 59 and in cases of self defense. 16 The sug-
gestion that such a standard might be appropriate in hostile environment
sexual harassment cases first appeared in a Harvard Law Review Note in
1984.161 In that note, the author suggested that the adoption of a reason-
able woman standard would protect females from behavior that they
found offensive but that males might not necessarily perceive in the same
way. 162 At the same time, because the standard assumes the perspective
of a reasonable woman, males would be protected from the claims of
hypersensitive victims. The author further argued that, "[b]y adopting
the woman's point of view as the norm, the courts might heighten male
sensitivity to the effects of sexually offensive conduct in the
workplace."' 63
The first judicial recognition of the reasonable woman standard ap-
peared in Judge Keith's dissent in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. 64 As
discussed earlier, the majority in Rabidue took a "boys will be boys"
attitude toward the conduct (the use of persistent obscene language and
the placement of obscene posters in the workplace) that the plaintiff
found offensive, adopting as the standard of review that of a "reasonable
person's reaction to a similar environment."' 65 Citing the Harvard Law
Review Note just discussed, Judge Keith recommended in his dissent that
155. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for cases adopting the "objective/sub-
jective" perspective.
156. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (Ist Cir. 1988).
157. See Jennings v. D.H.L. Airlines, 101 F.R.D. 549, 551 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("focus of
the question of sexual harassment should be on the defendant's conduct, not the plain-
tiff's perception or reaction to the defendant's conduct").
158. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
159. See William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts 37 (4th ed. 1971).
160. See State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (Wash. 1977).
161. See Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title
VII, supra note 2, at 1459.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986).
165. Id. at 620.
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the court should have instead adopted the perspective of the reasonable
victim, a perspective that, according to Judge Keith, "simultaneously al-
lows courts to consider salient sociological differences as well as shield
employers from the neurotic complainant."' 166 Addressing the majority's
view that Title VII could not change a social environment in which wo-
men are pictured as sex objects in multiple dimensions, Judge Keith
stated that "unless the outlook of the reasonable woman is adopted, the
defendants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrained no-
tions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case,
men."1
67
Since Rabidue, several courts have expressly adopted the reasonable
woman standard recommended by Judge Keith.' 6 The standard did not
receive much publicity or widespread support, however, until the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Ellison v. Brady.'69 The plaintiff, Ms. Ellison,
worked as a revenue agent for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in
California. The defendant, a male co-worker, sought repeatedly to pur-
sue a social relationship with her. The plaintiff was upset by these unwel-
come advances and attempted to avoid contact with him. Subsequently,
while Ms. Ellison was away on business, the defendant wrote her a long,
amorous letter. At trial, she testified that she thought that the defendant
was "crazy . . . nuts" and that she did not know what he would do
next. 7 Although her supervisor attempted to resolve the issue, he did
not do so to her satisfaction, and she filed a formal complaint with the
IRS. The Treasury Department rejected Ms. Ellison's complaint on the
basis that there was no pattern or practice of harassment as required by
the EEOC regulations. Ms. Ellison then appealed to the EEOC. The
EEOC affirmed the Treasury Department's decision, but on different
grounds-that the IRS had taken adequate action to prevent the repeti-
tion of the conduct.
Ms. Ellison subsequently sued in federal district court. The district
court judge granted the government's summary judgment motion "on
the ground that Ellison had failed to state a prima facie case of sexual
harassment due to a hostile working environment."' 171
The Ninth Circuit, on appeal, ruled in Ms. Ellison's favor. In doing
so, it became the first court expressly and emphatically to adopt the "rea-
sonable woman" standard in hostile environment cases. As the court
explained it, "[w]e adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman primar-
ily because we believe that a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends
to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of
166. Id. at 626 (citing Sexual Harassment Claims ofAbusive Work Environment Under
Title VII, supra note 2, at 1459).
167. Id.
168. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819
F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987).
169. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
170. Id. at 874. The facts presented here appear on pages 873-75 of Ellison.
171. Id. at 875.
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women.""7 2 As support for this view, the court cited literature and re-
search 173 showing that women interpret conduct of a sexual nature differ-
ently from men.174
The court noted that it was adopting the standard despite the fact that
it would apply to males whose innocent, well-intentioned comments were
perceived as harassing from the reasonable woman's perspective:
We note that the reasonable victim standard we adopt today classifies
conduct as unlawful sexual harassment even when harassers do not
realize that their conduct creates a hostile working environment.
Well-intentioned compliments by co-workers or supervisors can form
the basis of a sexual harassment cause of action if a reasonable victim
of the same sex as the plaintiff would consider the comments suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter a condition of employment and cre-
ate an abusive working environment. That is because Title VII is not a
fault-based tort scheme. 175
The Ninth Circuit also pointed out that analyzing the facts from the har-
asser's perspective might lead one to believe that the defendant in Ellison
was merely a "modern-day Cyrano de Bergerac." 176 Measured from the
reasonable victim's perspective, however, such behavior was outside the
norm, giving rise to fear of further harassment and possible physical
harm.
In creating a "reasonable woman" standard, the Ellison court clearly
intended to establish aggressive new guidelines for conduct in the work-
place rather than adhere to a traditional standard that, in its view, simply
reinforced prevailing levels of discrimination. 177 Although it is prema-
ture to judge the full effect of this case, a number of federal and state
courts have adopted some version of the Ellison approach. 178 For exam-
172. Id at 879.
173. See id. at 879 n.9.
174. The court stated:
We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a group,
but we believe that many women share common concerns which men do not
necessarily share. For example, because women are disproportionately victims
of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger incentive to be concerned
with sexual behavior. Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harass-
ment may understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prel-
ude to violent sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault,
may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social
setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive.
Id. at 879 (footnotes omitted).
175. Id at 880 (footnote omitted).
176. Id
177. See Eric J. Wallach & Alyse L. Jacobson, 'Reasonable Woman' Test Catches On,
Nat'l L.J., July 6, 1992, at 21.
178. See Austen v. Hawaii, 759 F. Supp. 612, 628 (D. Haw. 1991); Jensen v. Eveleth
Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657, 665 (D. Minn. 1991) (used the Ellison test to certify a class
in a gender discrimination case); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509,
1515 (D. Me.) (using Ellison by analogy in a racial "hostile environment" case), vacated
in part for other reasons, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (1991); Carillo v. Ward, 770 F. Supp. 815, 822
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F. Supp. 283, 294 (E.D. Pa.
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ple, in analyzing comments made by a male supervisor to the female
plaintiff, a federal district court in Hawaii stated that "[h]e referred to
her in ways which reasonable women consider to be typical of males who
consider women inferior." '179 Using Ellison by analogy in a racial harass-
ment case, another court stated that "the fact-finder must 'walk a mile in
the victim's shoes.' ""o Generally, courts that have adopted the reason-
able woman standard in sexual harassment cases seem intent on eradicat-
ing this particular form of discrimination by replacing a standard that
reflects older, male-generated workplace norms with a standard that is
more in tune with today's ideal of a dual sex, equal status work
environment.
The fact that a number of courts have adopted the Ellison reasonable
woman standard suggests that it will play an increasingly important role
in sexual harassment cases. For that reason, it is important to explore in
some depth the full implications of adopting such a standard to replace
more traditional measures for evaluating allegedly harassing conduct.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING A "REASONABLE
WOMAN" STANDARD
Applying a "reasonable woman" standard in Title VII cases raises nu-
merous legal, ethical, and social questions. Undoubtedly, the most
troubling question is whether it is proper or fair to impose liability, in-
cluding potential liability for substantial money damages181 on men (and
on their employers) for well-intentioned behavior that they do not realize
is illegal or offensive.
A. Sexual Harassment: Facts and Figures
Practical experience and a substantial body of research data suggest
that the behavior of many men in the workplace annoys and offends
many women. Estimates of the number of women who feel they have
been sexually harassed in the workplace range from forty percent, 8 2 to
1991); Radtke v. Everett, 471 N.W. 2d 660, 664 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal granted,
487 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. 1992); T.L. v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 605 A.2d 1125, 1135 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
179. Austen v. Hawaii, 759 F. Supp. 612, 628 (D. Haw. 1991).
180. Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 (D. Me.), vacated in
part for other reasons, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (1991).
181. As discussed supra note 62, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorizes compensatory
and punitive damages for cases involving intentional sexual discrimination in employ-
ment. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072
(1991) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a).
182. See, e.g., Riger, supra note 5, at 497 (citing U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board,
Sexual harassment in the federal workplace: Is it a problem? (1981)) (first comprehensive
national survey of sexual harassment among federal employees determined that roughly
40% of working women report having experienced sexual harassment, and updated study




fifty percent, 1 3 to sixty percent.1 4 In fact, one report estimates the true
figure to be as high as ninety percent.1" 5 Studies show that most inci-
dents involve men over 35 years old harassing women under the age of
34.186 In over eighty percent of the cases, according to one study, the
harasser occupies a more powerful position in the organization than the
victim.' Relatively few of the victims are men-only about fifteen
percent.1
8 8
Although women have historically considered it "career suicide" to
take formal action against their harassers,' s9 a growing number of wo-
men have begun breaking their silence. 9 For example, since 1980, over
38,500 persons, the vast majority of whom are women, have filed sexual
harassment complaints with the EEOC.' 91 Moreover, the number is on
the rise. In 1986, the Commission received 4,504 complaints. 9 In
1991, that number rose to 6,675.' 93 Based on the reported rate of in-
crease, the EEOC seemed likely to receive over 9,000 complaints in
1992.194
B. Men's Intentions and Motives
One of the most controversial aspects of the sexual harassment debate
centers on the reasons for men's harassing behavior. On the one hand,
some would agree with the reader responding to a survey conducted by
Working Woman magazine who asserted that harassing behavior is moti-
vated by men's desire to control women rather than by sexual desire.
According to this view, " '[t]he harasser wants a victim, not a playmate,
183. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 n.19 (1st Cir. 1988)
(citing a number of studies documenting sexual harassment in the workplace, including
one that maintains that nearly 50% of working women are sexually harassed on the job).
184. See Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment The Inside Story, Working Woman,
June 1992, at 47, 48 (survey by Working Woman Magazine found that 60% of women
who responded reported being sexually harassed).
185. See David E. Terpstra & Susan F Cook, Complainant Characteristics and Re-
ported Behaviors and Consequences Associated with Formal Sexual Harassment Charges,
38 Personnel Psychol. 559, 559 (1985).
186. See Sandroff, supra note 184, at 48.
187. See id.; see also Riger, supra note 5, at 497 (citing several studies that "[w]omen
with low power and status, whether due to lower age, being single or divorced, or being in
a marginal position in the organization are more likely to be harassed").
188. See Riger, supra note 5, at 497.
189. See, eg., Sandroff, supra note 184, at 47, 50 (according to Working Woman sur-
vey, among women who have been harassed, "only 40 percent told the harasser to stop,
and just 26 percent reported the harassment"); Riger, supra note 5, at 497 (noting that
"[d]espite the high rates found in surveys of sexual harassment of women, few complaints
are pursued through official grievance procedures").
190. See Jane Gross, Suffering in Silence No More: Fighting Sexual Harassment, N.Y.
Times, July 13, 1992, at Al, D10.
191. See H.R. Rep. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 606 n.63.





and a woman with modest dress, makeup and comportment is just as
likely-maybe even more likely-to be harassed.' " 95 On the other
hand, a number of courts1 96 and commentators 9 7 have concluded that a
great deal of what women consider to be sexual harassment constitutes
innocent, well-intentioned behavior by men. To say that this behavior is
innocent and well-intentioned, however, is not to say that those who ana-
lyze it think it should be ignored or excused. To the contrary, critics of
male behavior assert that, despite men's benign intentions, behavior that
offends women should be prohibited and punished. As Professor Nancy
Ehrenreich writes:
I... believe that some men who engage in (what I would call) harass-
ing behavior do so with neither conscious hostility towards women nor
an awareness of the effect of their conduct, and I have no doubt that
such men would feel personally wronged by judgments declaring their
conduct harassment. (Other men, of course, are perfectly aware of
what they are doing.) Nevertheless, I am convinced.., that while the
elimination of inequality in society inevitably makes some people feel
wronged--entailing, as it does, a reduction in the social status and
privilege of those on the top of the hierarchy, regardless of whether
they harbor personal hostility toward those beneath them-that fact
195. Sandroff, supra note 184, at 49 (quoting a Washington professor).
196. See, eg., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[C]omplete
understanding of the victim's view requires, among other things, an analysis of the differ-
ent perspectives of men and women. Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable
may offend many women."); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d
Cir. 1990) ("Although men may find [obscene language and pornography] harmless and
innocent, it is highly possible that women may feel otherwise."); Lipsett v. University of
Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988):
A male supervisor might believe, for example, that it is legitimate for him to tell
a female subordinate that she has a "great figure" or "nice legs." The female
subordinate, however, may find such comments offensive. Such a situation
presents a dilemma for both the man and the woman: the man may not realize
that his comments are offensive, and the woman may be fearful of criticizing her
supervisor.
id.; Radtke v. Everett, 471 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991):
[I]t is important to analyze and understand the different perspectives of men
and women. [B]ecause of their historical vulnerability in the work force, women
are more likely to regard a verbal or physical sexual encounter as a coercive and
degrading reminder that the woman involved is viewed more as an object of
sexual desire than as a credible coworker deserving of respect.
(citations omitted), appeal granted, 487 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. 1992).
197. See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 2, at 1207-1208 (noting that men tend to view
some forms of sexual harassment as "harmless social interactions to which only overly-
sensitive women would object"); Staton & Sinner, supra note 2, at 10 (arguing that Title
VII should apply to behavior that many men would not "even realize is inappropriate, or
which may have been well-intentioned"); Riger, supra, note 5, at 499 ("Men tend to find
sexual overtures from women at work to be flattering, whereas women find similar ap-
proaches from men to be insulting .... Whatever the cause, a reasonable man and a
reasonable woman are likely to differ in their judgments of whether a particular behavior
constitutes sexual harassment."); Abrams, supra note 13, at 1203 (noting that a "charac-
teristically male view, which depicts sexual taunts, inquiries or magazines as a compara-
tively harmless amusement... pervades many recent court opinions").
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does not justify its perpetuation.' 98
The recent passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991199 makes it even more
important for men and their employers to address this issue, since inten-
tional sexual harassment under Title VII now carries the potential for
substantial compensatory and punitive damages. 2'
C. Differences Between the Sexes
To conclude that male behavior, however innocent and well-inten-
tioned from the man's point of view, can offend many women indicates
the existence of fundamental differences in attitudes and approaches be-
tween the sexes. Such a view challenges the notion that women and men
are virtually interchangeable in the workplace. Although this realization
may trouble proponents of absolute equality in employment, the fact is
that recent research strongly suggests major differences between the sexes
on a number of dimensions not previously recognized.2° For example,
Professor Deborah Tannen's research has focused on the differences be-
tween men's and women's conversational styles. Despite her misgivings
about the differences between the sexes, she insists they are real and
significant:
The desire to affirm that women are equal has made some scholars
reluctant to show they are different, because differences can be used to
justify unequal treatment and opportunity. Much as I understand and
am in sympathy with those who wish there were no differences be-
tween women and men-only reparable social injustice-my research,
others' research, and my own and others' experience tell me that it
simply isn't so. There are gender differences in ways of speaking, and
we need to identify and understand them. Without such understand-
ing, we are d6omed to blame others or ourselves--or the relation-
ship---for the otherwise mystifying and damaging effects of our
contrasting conversational styles.20 2
Why do men and women have such different perspectives? Professor
Tannen suggests that, in the case of conversational styles, the sexes differ
because they grow up in different worlds:
198. Ehrenreich, supra note 2, at 1194-95.
199. See supra note 62.
200. See infra notes 242-60 and accompanying text.
201. See, ,g., Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Wo-
men's Development (1982) (arguing that men and women approach moral decision-mak-
ing from different perspectives); Deborah Tannen, You Just Don't Understand: Women
and Men in Conversation 17 (1990) (recognizing that men and women approach conver-
sations from different perspectives); Abrams, supra note 13, at 1187-97 (citing a number
of feminist scholars who perceive differences on a number of dimensions between the
sexes and stating that "[d]escribing the world as if socially created gender differences did
not exist seems to me a strained and misleading undertaking"); Riger, supra note 5, at
499 (citing a number of analyses that recognize "clear-cut and persistent" gender differ-
ences in the perception of what constitutes sexual harassment).
202. Tannen, supra note 201, at 17.
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Even if they grow up in the same neighborhood, on the same block, or
in the same house, girls and boys grow up in different worlds of words.
Others talk to them differently and expect and accept different ways of
talking from them. Most importantly, children learn how to talk, how
to have conversations, not only from their parents but from their
peers. 20
3
If such differences exist in conversational styles, one should not be sur-
prised to find even greater differences in attitudes toward sex. Presuma-
bly the gender differences cited by Professor Tannen with respect to
conversational styles produce dramatically different views between men
and women regarding what constitutes sexual harassment.
On this point, Professor Kathryn Abrams argues that women are more
sensitive to sexual matters, offering several reasons why this is so: women
often feel their positions in the work force are precarious, and therefore
"are likely to construe disturbing personal interactions, stereotypical
views of women, or other affronts to their competence as workers as seri-
ous judgments about their ability to succeed in the work environ-
ment.""z  Moreover, their greater physical and social vulnerability to
sexual coercion makes many women wary of sexual encounters. Accord-
ingly, "the appearance of sexuality in an unexpected context or a setting
of ostensible equality can be an anguishing experience. '20 5
Although studies such as these strongly suggest that substantial differ-
ences exist between the sexes, other data challenge this view. A recent
poll by the Roper Organization20 6 based on interviews with 1,026 em-
ployed men and women found that:
Despite the uproar following the Clarence Thomas hearings, sexual
harrassment [sic] in the workplace is not common, and the vast major-
ity of Americans are satisfied with the way their employers are treating
the problems .... Moreover, the survey finds no great difference be-
tween men and women in their perceptions of the relative severity of
the problem and on the definitions of what constitutes sexual
harassment. 20 7
Whatever the reason for the differences-if they exist-with respect to
the extent of sexual harassment, courts have expressed concern that ap-
plying the traditional "reasonable man's" or "reasonable person's" stan-
dard in sexual harassment cases may excuse behavior that most men find
acceptable but that irritates and offends many reasonable women.208
203. Id. at 43.
204. Abrams, supra note 13, at 1205.
205. Id.
206. See Roper Poll, supra note 15.
207. Id. at 1.
208. According to the Ellison court:
We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman primarily because we believe
that a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to
systematically ignore the experiences of women. . . . Instead, a gender-con-
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Yet, as we discuss below, applying a "reasonable woman's" standard
raises other important concerns.
D. Competing Standards
The term "reasonable man" is burdened by an enormous amount of
historical baggage. Dating back at least two hundred years,2"9 the term
undeniably evolved from extremely male-oriented legal and cultural
roots. As A.P. Herbert noted in a 1928 commentary, "[i]n all [the] mass
of authorities which [bear] upon this branch of the law there is no single
mention of a reasonable woman."210 To the contrary, early American
jurisprudence equated the degree of diligence required of women with
that which the law expected of children or incompetents.2 1
Although we have not undertaken an empirical study on this point, we
believe that most courts and scholars have in recent years abandoned the
term "reasonable man" in favor of the term "reasonable person."212 Pre-
sumably, this alternative term encompasses both sexes and is gender-neu-
tral. The more traditional "reasonable man" or "reasonable person"
standard was applied in many areas of law.2" 3 In their conventional ap-
plication, these terms generally carried two meanings: (i) an ideal, albeit
not perfect, person whose behavior served as an objective measure
against which to judge our actions and (ii) an average or typical person
possesing all of the shortcomings and weaknesses tolerated by the
community. 214
In the context of the Title VII debate, the latter meaning is key. 215
That is, those courts that have moved to the "reasonable woman" stan-
dard intend it to describe average or typical women-women who react
scions examination of sexual harassment enables women to participate in the
workplace on an equal footing with men.
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
209. According to Professor Ronald Collins, one of the first references to the phrase is
found in Sir William Jones's 1796 work on the law of bailments. See Collins, supra note
11, at 312-13.
210. Alan Patrick Herbert, Misleading Cases in the Common Law 13 (1928) (quoted
in Collins, supra note 11, at 315).
211. See Collins, supra note 11, at 316 (citing Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32, 41-42
(1873)).
212. Informal evidence of this trend is found in the fact that a Lexis search for the
term "reasonable person" in federal appeals court opinions published after 1990 was not
allowed to proceed because it would have retrieved more than 1,000 cases. In contrast,
the same search for "reasonable man" found only 86 cases.
213. According to Professor Collins, the "reasonable man" standard was the recog-
nized standard for reviewing culpable conduct in administrative law, bailment law, con-
stitutional law, contract law, criminal law, and the law of trusts. It was also the
traditional measure in the study of legal ethics. See Collins, supra note 11, at 313.
214. See id. at 314.
215. The "ideal but not perfect" standard serves as a model for judging the conduct of
those accused of committing torts, not for gauging the appropriate response of those
against whom torts are committed. Arguably an "ideal but not perfect" reasonable per-




differently to situations than do most men but who, at the same time, are
neither hypersensitive to216 nor unoffended by2 17 by men's workplace
behavior.
E. Models of Sexual Harassment Views
In reviewing the approaches that courts have adopted to date in distin-
guishing between the reasonable man and reasonable woman perspec-
tives, we find it helpful to consider the various views that courts could
take on this issue. We identify five general possibilities, each of which is
reviewed below.
First, it is conceivable that what reasonable men and reasonable wo-
men consider sexual harassment might not overlap at all. If such a
model accurately described the state of attitudes in the American work-
place, any attempt to develop a "reasonable person" test would create a
null set (unless, of course, one were simply to choose one sex as reason-
able and reject the other as unreasonable).21 In such a case, behavior
considered harassing by one sex would not be considered so by the other.
Common sense suggests that this model is inaccurate, since both reason-
able men and reasonable women regard certain male conduct toward wo-
men (e.g., rape and other physical attacks, lewd sexual overtures, and the
sending of obscene letters) with disgust or distaste. Reasonable members
of both sexes, we suggest, would find these actions to constitute sexual
harassment. Even male perpetrators of these extremely coercive acts, ex-
cept perhaps those lost to insanity, would concede their impropriety.
Figure 2 illustrates the equally unlikely possibility that reasonable men
and women might view behavior with respect to sexual harassment from
precisely identical perspectives. If this model reflected the true state of
216. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, B79 (9th Cir. 1991) (employers need not
"accommodate the idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee"); Robin-
son v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525, 530 (M.D. Fla. 1988) ("Title VII
liability attaches when the case is proved as to the reasonable person, and it does not
extend further based on any hypersensitivity of a particular plaintiff."); Zabkowicz v.
West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984) ("Title VII does not serve as a
vehicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hypersensitive."); Radtke v. Ever-
ett, 471 N.W.2d 660, 665 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (plaintiff cannot prevail if she has an
"idiosyncratic or hypersensitive" reaction to co-worker's behavior), appeal granted, 487
N.W.2d 762 (Mich. 1992).
217. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 1991) (no sexual harass-
ment where court found "[b]y any objective standard, the behavior of the male [co-work-
ers] toward Reed revealed at trial was, to say the least, repulsive. But apparently not to
Reed .... [S]he . . . relished reciprocating in kind."); Christoforou v. Ryder Truck
Rental, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 294, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (plaintiff admitted that instances of
alleged harassing behavior did not interfere with her work ability), cited with approval in
Robinson, 118 F.R.D. at 530; Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633 F. Supp. 1323, 1327
(S.D. Miss. 1986) (plaintiff contributed to and apparently enjoyed situation alleged to be
harassing behavior), cited in Robinson, 118 F.R.D. at 530.
218. Historically, of course, courts did adopt one view-the reasonable man stan-
dard-to the exclusion of all other perspectives. See Collins, supra note 11, at 312-15.





affairs, there would be no need for a "reasonable woman" standard. In-
stead, courts could simply apply the "reasonable person" standard, since
this standard would by definition fully reflect the views of both reason-
able men and reasonable women. It is this model, however, that a
number of courts and scholars have strongly challenged in recent
years.2 19 According to these critics, men and women may see some be-
havior similarly, but they see other behavior quite differently. Of course,
whether broad, meaningful differences exist between the perspectives of
the sexes remains a question that is subject to ongoing research and
219. See supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
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No Overlap of Views
Regarding Sexual Harrassment
Complete Agreement Regarding
What Constitutes Sexual Harrassment
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
debate.22 °
The next three models illustrate possibilities in which some, but not
all, of men's and women's views toward sexual harassment overlap. Fig-
ure 3 depicts the possibility that reasonable men and reasonable women
share some views, but that men view some behavior as harassment that
women do not and that, conversely, women view some behavior as har-
assment that men do not. Assuming that Figure 3 presented a realistic
Figure 3
picture of the sexes' attitudes toward harassment (an assumption that
seems highly improbable), the task of deciding which conduct violates
Title VII and which does not would be daunting. Obviously, courts
would reject a test that implicates only the behavior that one sex or the
other considers to be harassment, since that would exclude acts such as
rape and sexually-oriented physical abuse that reasonable members of
both sexes see as harassing. Choosing only the area on which both sexes
agree (the intersection of the two circles in Figure 3) would permit a
220. See, ag., Roper Poll, supra note 15 and accompanying text (surveying perceptions
of men and women regarding what constitutes sexual harassment). As noted by Burns
W. Roper, chairman of the Roper Organization,
[t]he most significant finding to me is how similarly men and women view the
issue of sexual harassment. While sexual harassment may be hard to define in
the abstract, both sexes seem to know it when they see it-and neither men nor
women think harassment is rampant in their own workplaces.
Id. at 2.
Partial Overlap of Views
Women Share Some Views With Men
Men Share Some Views With Women
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form of "reasonable person" test, but would fail to consider the serious
additional concerns on which the sexes disagree. Perhaps the more real-
istic approach would be to include offensive conduct that falls into the
circle representing either sex plus any behavior included in the area of
overlap. Thus, the definition of a "reasonable person" under this model
would be offensive conduct that reasonable members of either or both
sexes consider sexual harassment.
Although theoretically possible, this model implies a reality not sug-
gested in any research or court rulings of which we are aware. Most
researchers would undoubtedly agree that many women take offense at
certain behavior of men that men think acceptable. The reverse, how-
ever, seems questionable-i.e., that many men consider certain conduct
to be sexual harassment that women do not also consider improper. Of
course, one can conjure up situations in which, for example, some men
might take umbrage at a female superior's insistence on calling them
"sensitive" or "considerate" in violation of the "macho" image that they
prefer to project. But such situations would seem rare, if they exist at all.
For the most part, we find it difficult to imagine harassing behavior that
men find offensive that would not also be offensive to women.
Along similar lines, Figure 4 illustrates the possibility that reasonable
men completely share women's views regarding sexual harassment, but
that reasonable men see additional behavior as harassment that reason-
able women do not. To say the least, this model flies in the face of cur-
rent research and recent court rulings.221 For the same reasons that we
questioned the practical application of the previous model, we also find
this model unrealistic.
Figure 5 describes a world in which reasonable women completely
share men's views regarding sexual harassment, but in which women
consider additional behavior as harassment that reasonable men do not.
As we have noted, although by no means a unanimous view,mn this
model comports with the current research and commentary of many
scholars in this area and with the thinking of a growing number of
courts.' Under this model, courts that wish to extend Title VII to in-
clude behavior that falls within both circles can do so in one of two ways:
they can define all conduct within either of the circles as offensive to a
"reasonable person," or they can indicate that they will apply a "reason-
able woman" standard that encompasses all behavior falling into either
circle. The trend seems to be toward the latter approach. 24
Precisely what behavior is it that troubles women, yet appears inno-
221. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 168-80. But see Roper Poll, supra note 15 and accompanying
text.
224. To say that this is the direction in which the courts seem headed is not to say that
a majority has yet accepted the reasonable woman standard. We also note that the
EEOC, always an influential voice in this area, phrases its test differently. The agency




Women Share Men's Views
But See Additional Things As Improper
Figure 5
cent to men? Unfortunately, as several courts have indicated, there is no
clear answer under Title VII. The problem is compounded by the fact
son,' " but also insists that "[t]he reasonable person standard should consider the victim's
perspective." Policy Guidance on Current Issues, supra note 6, at 102-03.
Men Share Women's Views
But See Additional Things As Improper
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that "[c]onduct considered harmless by many today may be considered
discriminatory in the future."225 For those courts that apply a "reason-
able victim's" or a "reasonable woman's" standard, then, the standard
for what constitutes sexual harassment will change as the views and atti-
tudes of women change.2 6
To say that the standard is a fluid one is not to say that the question of
what constitutes offensive conduct remains a complete mystery. A re-
view of recent sexual harassment cases reveals at least some broad pat-
terns and trends. These cases indicate that, among the types of behavior
not generally viewed as offensive by male workers but objected to by fe-
male employees are the pervasive use of obscene language by co-work-
ers, 22 displays of pornography in common areas and in the plaintiff's
personal work space, 228 and the conduct of male supervisors who tell
female subordinates that they have a" 'great figure' " or" 'nice legs' ,,229
or who write repeated unwelcome love letters.230
As we have noted, a number of writers and researchers have suggested
an expanded view with respect to other conduct that fits into the "men
see nothing wrong; women find it offensive" category. Professor
Ehrenreich would include "milder" forms of harassment, such as "sug-
gestive looks, repeated requests for dates, and sexist jokes."2' Professor
Abrams would include "verbal sexual abuse, casual touching, and dis-
semination or display of pornography. 111 2 Professor Riger adds that
"more subtle forms of behavior such as sexual jokes or comments" offend
many women and should be considered sexual harassment. 2 3 Above all,
Riger believes that "policymakers and others need to learn to 'think like
a woman' to define which behaviors constitute harassment."'  Whether
behavior of this type troubles working women as much as these authors
225. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879, n.12 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
226. See Radtke v. Everett, 471 N.W.2d 660, 665 n.10 (Mich. CL App. 1991), appeal
granted, 487 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. 1992).
227. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485-86 (3d Cir. 1990).
228. See id.; Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525, 530-31 (M.D.
Fla. 1988). But see Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988)
(expressing disagreement with district court's determination that presence of obscene
drawing of plaintiff on walls of men's room constituted harassment), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1020.
229. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (hypo-
thetical example cited by court to illustrate behavior considered innocent by male super-
visor, but offensive to a female subordinate); accord Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878
(9th Cir. 1991).
230. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
231. Ehrenreich, supra note 2, at 1208. Professor Ehrenreich argues that the "persis-
tent behavior of this 'milder' sort is just as disturbing to many women as is overt quid pro
quo harassment." Id. (citation omitted).
232. Abrams, supra note 13, at 1206. Abrams states that "If these... forms of em-
ployment discrimination against women are to be corrected, and if the norms that permit
them to flourish are to be modified, then courts must employ a standard that reflects
women's perceptions of sexual harassment." Id.




assert remains unclear, however.235
F. Legal Liability for Innocent Reasonable Acts
To the extent that courts impose liability on men's conduct that stems
from innocent and reasonable motives, courts apply a form of strict lia-
bility. To analogize to section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, liability
would attach to men's behavior despite the fact that they have exercised
"all possible care"2 36 in their conduct toward women.
Casting a wide liability net under Title VII is not a new approach. The
EEOC has long interpreted Title VII as forbidding conduct that "has the
purpose or effect of. . . creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment, 2 37 and the Ellison Court noted the "no fault" na-
ture of Title VII in explaining its adoption of the reasonable woman
standard:
We note that the reasonable victim standard we adopt today classifies
conduct as unlawful... even when harassers do not realize that their
conduct creates a hostile working environment .... That is because
Title VII is not a fault-based tort scheme. "Title VII is aimed at the
consequences or effects of an employment practice and not at the...
motivation" of co-workers or employers.1
31
Further, courts have historically been willing, in certain types of cases, to
hold an actor liable for harmful behavior despite the actor's good inten-
tions.2 39 For example, courts have for many years applied liability with-
out fault to the owners of animals that inflict physical harm or property
damage, to those individuals who engage in abnormally dangerous activi-
235. See Roper Poll, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
236. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a) (1965). This section imposes liability
on product sellers "although the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product." Id.
237. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, § 1604.1 l(a)(3) (emphasis added).
238. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); see also
Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 (D. Me.) ("Victims need
establish neither the fault nor the discriminatory intent of their employers and co-work-
ers to succeed under Title VII."), vacated in part for other reasons, 765 F. Supp. 1529
(1991); Staton & Sinner, supra note 2, at 9 ("Title VII was not designed to be a fault-
based scheme.").
239. See Keeton et al., supra note 11, at 536. According to the authors:
Tort liability never has been inconsistent with the ignorance which is bliss, or
the good intentions with which hell is said to be paved. A trespasser is not
excused by the honest, reasonable belief that the land is his own; a bona-fide
purchaser of stolen goods is held liable for conversion; the publisher of a libel
commits a tort, although he has no means of knowing the defamatory nature of
his words. There are many situations in which a careful person is held liable for
an entirely reasonable mistake. In all this there is nothing new. Socially , and
legally, these defendants are at fault; whether they are individually so, in spite
of the fact that they are blameless, appears to be entirely a matter of definition,
rather than of substance, and the argument leads only to a pointless dispute




ties, and to the producers of manufactured products.2"
Of course, saying that ample precedent exists for applying strict liabil-
ity generally does not answer the question of whether strict liability
should be applied in Title VII cases specifically. Despite the fact the
Professor Prosser and his co-authors seem comfortable with the concept
of no-fault tort liability,241 most people sense a substantial moral differ-
ence between offenses committed deliberately and those done unwit-
tingly, and the question of intent figures prominently in many civil and
most criminal cases. 42 Moreover, as discussed in the section that fol-
lows, the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act have upped the ante
considerably. Previously, Title VII violations carried only relatively mild
sanctions: back pay and injunctive relief. 243 Under the new amend-
ments, however, intentional violations are now subject to punitive and
expanded compensatory damages.2 "
G. Damages for Intentional Violations Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991
Historically, the primary federal statute for recovering damages for
employment discrimination has been section 1981 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.245 In the past, however, damages under section 1981 were
available only in intentional discrimination cases in which the discrim-
ination was based on the race of the victim.2" This changed with the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, under which victims of intentional discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex, religion, or disability are now entitled to recover
compensatory and punitive damages,247 albeit with some limita-
240. See generally id. at 534-83 (overview of strict liability).
241. See id at 535-36. As the authors argue:
There is a broader sense in which "fault" means nothing more than a departure
from a standard of conduct required of a person by society for the protection of
his neighbors; and if the departure is an innocent one, and the defendant cannot
help it, it is none the less a departure, and a social wrong. The distinction still
remains between the person who has deviated from the standard, and the per-
son who has not.
Id (footnote omitted).
242. For example, the question of whether a killing was done intentionally, recklessly,
or unwittingly can make the difference between a defendant being convicted for murder
or walking free.
243. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (1991)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Policy
Guidance on Application of Damages Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pend-
ing Charges and Pre-Act Conduct, N-915.002 (BNA) 441-42 (Dec. 27, 1991).
244. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072
(1991) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
246. In particularly egregious cases, plaintiffs could also recover punitive damages.
See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), cited in H.R. Rep. No.
40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1991); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
247. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072
(1991) (to be codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981a).
1993]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW[
tions. 248 If, as seems likely, courts continue to adopt a "reasonable wo-
man" standard and to expand the types of conduct that constitute a
"hostile environment" under Title VII, the 1991 Civil Rights Act will
become a battleground of major proportions, especially with respect to
what constitutes "intentional" discrimination. Specifically, those courts
that have adopted a "reasonable woman" standard that encompasses
conduct that "harassers do not realize... creates a hostile working envi-
ronment 249 will have to decide whether such conduct falls within the
intent requirement of the 1991 amendments.
The most directly analogous precedents for determining the meaning
of "intent" in this context are the so-called "disparate treatment" cases
under section 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act-cases that
require a showing of discriminatory intent for a plaintiff to recover.2"'
Presumably, the courts will look to this established case law for guidance
regarding what constitutes "intentional" discrimination under the 1991
amendments.
In "disparate treatment" cases, courts generally follow the guidelines
set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine.251 First, a plaintiff must establish a "prima facie" case
in which she shows that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she
is otherwise situated similarly to members of the unprotected class, and
(3) she was treated differently from members of the unprotected class.252
Once the plaintiff has established this prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to the employer to produce evidence that the reason for treating
the plaintiff differently was not an "invidious" one (i.e., the employer
must show that its treatment of the employee was not motivated by a
discriminatory intent).253 The employer must further produce a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason for treating the plaintiff differently from
members of the unprotected class. The burden then shifts back to the
plaintiff, who must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer's articulated reason was merely a "pretext" for
discrimination.254
248. Unlike race discrimination cases, for which there are no limits on recoveries,
damages for cases involving intentional discrimination under the 1991 Civil Rights Act
are capped, with the cap limits determined by the number of persons employed by the
defendant. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071,
1073 (1991) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981b(3)).
249. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991).
250. The two leading disparate treatment cases are a Supreme Court case, Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), and the case discussed in the subse-
quent paragraphs, Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
251. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
252. See id. at 252-53. The Court first articulated these standards for Title VII cases in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For an example of how a court
applies these general guidelines to determine whether a prima facie case exists, see Ram-
sey v. American Air Filter Co., 772 F.2d 1303, 1307-09 (7th Cir. 1985).
253. See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 1987).
254. See, eg., Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1991) (employee
has burden of showing that employer's reason for denial of promotion was "pretext" for
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Whether the courts will adopt this model to address cases in which a
reasonable man innocently creates a hostile working environment re-
mains to be seen. These cases are difficult because the offensive conduct
is clearly intentional in the sense that the defendant will have committed
a volitional, voluntary act. The defendant will not, however, have in-
tended-either from his perspective or that of a "reasonable man"-any-
thing improper. Yet, his behavior would have offended a "reasonable
female" employee, thereby qualifying the plaintiff's claim as a Title VII
cause of action in those courts that have adopted the reasonable woman
standard.
Based on our review of current law, we question whether the courts
will impose damages for intentional sexual harassment in these cases. In
analogous "disparate treatment" cases, many courts look for a discrimi-
natory "animus" indicating that the defendant was in fact motivated by
ill will or meanspiritedness. 2 "5 Simply using bad judgment, as in cases
involving employment favoritism towards relatives that effectively denies
opportunities to members of a protected class, has been found not to rise
to the level of discriminatory intent.25 6 Moreover, several courts have
held that acts committed in good faith, even if the acts are in fact dis-
criminatory or otherwise improper, do not demonstrate discriminatory
intent.25
7
Traditional tort principles place the concept of intent on a sliding
discrimination); Billups v. Methodist Hosp. of Chicago, 922 F.2d 1300, 1303 (7th Cir.
1991) ("pretext" may be demonstrated either directly by persuading court that discrimi-
natory reason more likely motivated employer, or indirectly by showing that employer's
proffered reason is unworthy of belief); Hayes v. Invesco, Inc., 907 F.2d 853, 858 (8th
Cir. 1990) (overruling district court's determination that employer's reason for differen-
tial treatment of black clinical nursing instructor was "pretextual").
255. See Hill v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 918 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 188 (1991); Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 853
F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1988); Springer v. Seamen, 821 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1987).
256. See Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1989).
257. See, eg., Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 189-90 (Ist Cir.
1990) (where employer terminated black employee on possibly mistaken assumption that
employee had instigated a fight with co-worker, fact that employer might have been mis-
taken tended to negate discriminatory intent so long as hospital acted in good faith);
Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1987) (where employer's
reason for alleged discriminatory act was honestly described, but poorly founded, court
will not find discriminatory intent), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1988); Wrenn v. Gould,
808 F.2d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 1987) (in evaluating discriminatory intent, court should look
to employer's motivation, not applicant's perceptions or even objective assessment of
what qualifications are required for particular position); Linder v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
743 F. Supp. 1237, 1245 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (employer's action, if based upon sincere belief
in business necessity, does not constitute discriminatory intent even where court con-
cludes that employer acted improperly); Howze v. Adams, 689 F. Supp. 20, 25 (D.D.C.
1988) (fact that employer's decision violated federal personnel law did not demonstrate
discriminatory intent); Grier v. Casey, 643 F. Supp. 298, 309 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (to find
that employer's action was non-discriminatory, trier of fact need only determine that
employer had good faith belief that employee's performance was unsatisfactory and that
asserted reason for the action was not a mere pretext for discrimination).
1993]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
scale258 demarcated by at least five possible categories of intentional or
quasi-intentional behavior: (i) mere inadvertence, (ii) acts in disregard of
consequences likely to follow, (iii) acts that invade the rights of another
under a mistaken belief of committing no wrong, 259 and (iv) acts where
the motive is a malevolent desire to do harm.2 1 Our reading of the "dis-
parate treatment" cases convinces us that the courts tend to find inten-
tional violations only with respect to the last category. If this is true, one
would imagine that the "reasonable man who innocently creates a hostile
working environment" cases will not trigger damages under the 1991
amendments to the Civil Rights Act. It is entirely possible, however,
that those courts willing to apply a "reasonable woman" standard will
adopt an extremely expansive view of what constitutes intentional dis-
crimination under the 1991 Amendments.
H. Concerns About the "Reasonable Woman" Standard
As Professor Ehrenreich has noted, no substantial change in social pol-
icies is pain-free.26' The move toward a "reasonable woman" standard
certainly qualifies as a substantial change in policy, the implementation
of which will create a number of potential problems that warrant discus-
sion. The analysis that follows should not be read as indicating that we
either reject or endorse the new standard. We do, however, see several
potential trouble spots that should be considered by the courts and by
advocates of an expansive "reasonable woman" standard under Title VII.
1. Overreaction
The adoption of the reasonable woman standard carries a strong po-
tential for overreaction by corporate officials who find that their compa-
nies are subject to a standard that presents such a moving and unclear
target. As previously noted,26 2 courts that have adopted the "reasonable
woman" standard have indicated that, as women's views change, work-
place behavior that is acceptable today may violate Title VII tomorrow.
With this in mind, risk-averse personnel managers and other corporate
supervisors may well adopt rules that go well beyond the law to ensure
258. See Keeton et al., supra note 11, at 37.
259. For example, where the defendant, over the protests of the plaintiff, tried to set a
broken arm and caused severe harm. See id.
260. See id.
261. According to Ehrenreich:
[A]ll acts by any one group (or individual) are inevitably harmful to others.
One side's freedom can always be seen as the other side's loss of security, one
side's equal treatment can seem like the other's unequal treatment, one group's
pursuit of its own interest can always be called intolerance of any other group
that is affected by that pursuit.
Ehrenreich, supra note 2, at 1221 (footnote omitted). Although we hesitate to look at the
world as one huge "zero-sum" game, we agree with Ehrenreich that major policy shifts
often require painful trade-offs among competing interests.
262. See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
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that their companies will not face Title VII liability.263 For example,
some companies might adopt rules that threaten employees with immedi-
ate dismissal for any physical contact, other than perhaps a simple hand-
shake, with fellow employees on the job.2 Or companies might bar any
display of nudity in the workplace, including in works of art, on the as-
sumption that nudity, however aesthetically portrayed, may offend some-
one.265 Similarly, to deal with concerns about "suggestive looks" in the
office,"' companies might adopt complex rules that prohibit "sexual
staring" or "offensive watching" by their employees.26 Further, in an
effort to combat both dirty jokes and jokes that demean women, compa-
nies might flatly prohibit the telling of jokes in the workplace.26 We
could go on, but we trust the point is clear: companies faced with poten-
tial liability under rapidly evolving and vague standards2 69 may feel the
need to protect themselves by adopting intrusive and, ultimately, unfair,
workplace restrictions. In particular, many harried corporate executives
may simply decide that they have neither the time nor the resources to
conduct workplace polls on a regular basis to determine with precision
which types of conduct currently offend their female employees. As a
result, they will tend to operate with a meat axe rather than a scalpel,
putting in place broad, prophylactic rules in an attempt to reduce the risk
of Title VII litigation and liability.
2. Fewer Women Hired
Under the "doctrine of unintended consequences," which states that
attempts at reform sometimes produce effects opposite to those intended,
it is possible that some employers in jurisdictions that adopt the "reason-
able woman" standard will become wary of hiring women. For example,
263. Our experience as faculty in a business school has sensitized us to the challenges
that face corporate officials in addressing new workplace rules. Because most laws pres-
ent "gray zones" in which it is not clear whether one's practices comply with the rules,
companies often try to insulate themselves from liability by drawing "bright line" rules
that bar conduct that even hints of a potential violation.
264. Needless to say, kissing under mistletoe at an office Christmas party would be
forbidden under this sort of rule.
265. See infra note 279.
266. See Ehrenreich, supra note 2, at 1207.
267. A company might, for example, define "sexual staring" as any glance at an em-
ployee that exceeds one second or that is directed below the employee's neck. The ques-
tion then becomes how to enforce the rule-perhaps by hiring office enforcers or using
office informants!
268. Again, a "bright line" rule such as this would work to insulate a company from
liability because, the company hopes, it would eliminate any vagueness or ambiguity re-
garding what constitutes a "dirty" joke or a joke that demeans women.
269. We do not suggest that Title VII is the only area of the law that requires employ-
ers to deal with changing and vague standards. Publishers, for example, face evolving
"contemporary community standards" that define what constitutes obscenity. See Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). We suspect, however, that the lines defining what
constitutes obscenity under the many Supreme Court decisions in this area are somewhat
clearer for publishing companies than are the boundaries separating acceptable from un-
acceptable conduct toward employees under recent Title VII decisions.
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when a company hires women to fill traditionally male jobs, it may feel
the need to implement immediate and, perhaps, costly changes in the
workplace to ensure that nothing in the environment offends the new
women workers. The unclear and evolving rules regarding what offends
"reasonable women" will also create concerns that, despite its best ef-
forts, a company will be found to have tolerated behavior and conditions
later determined to constitute harassing conduct or a hostile environ-
ment. Faced with these prospects, the company may simply adopt an
explicit strategy to structure jobs in the "sex is a bona-fide occupational
qualification" mold27 or, more likely, continue its unenthusiastic ap-
proach to hiring women. In other words, companies in reasonable wo-
man jurisdictions may be reluctant to hire women if every one hired
carries a heightened threat of a lawsuit.
3. Freedom of Speech
Although we tend not to see an increased push for "politically correct"
speech in the workplace, a trend that we deplore, as an imminent danger,
there are legitimate freedom of speech concerns associated with the wide-
spread adoption of a "reasonable woman" standard. At the outset, we
note that the recent Supreme Court ruling in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul2""
clearly raises more questions than it answers regarding permissible re-
strictions of free speech. In that case, the Court invalidated, by a 5-4
vote, a city ordinance banning certain types of "hate speech" on the
ground that the ordinance improperly imposed "content discrimination"
on otherwise proscribable speech. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
stated that the city could not ban hate speech if the only categories cov-
ered by the ordinance were speech directed at race, color, creed, religion,
or gender. In the Court's opinion, the ordinance must ban either all such
speech or none of it. For the city to do otherwise would, in effect, "li-
cense one side of the debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to
follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules." '272
In an apparent effort to assuage the concerns of those who might con-
clude that, like the hate speech ordinance, hostile environment rules
promulgated under Title VII are also unconstitutional because they pro-
hibit only certain offensive words,273 the majority specifically stated that
under the so-called "secondary effects" doctrine, the incidental regula-
tion of speech under Title VII would not be considered unconstitutional
270. See EEOC Guidelines, supra note 33, § 1604.2 for the agency's rules regarding
"sex as a bona fide occupational qualification."
271. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
272. Id. at 2548.
273. For example, Title VII has typically been interpreted as covering only certain
categories of discrimination, such as race, color, sex, or national origin. Thus, Title VII
protects an employee against racial taunts or abusive sexual slurs, but not, say, against
co-workers who mock his southern accent or his "Southerness." See Williams v. Frank,
757 F. Supp. 112, 120 (D. Mass. 1991).
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under the Court's reasoning in R.A. V 274 But this attempt to distinguish
regulation under Title VII from the St. Paul ordinance drew a skeptical
response from Justice White and the other dissenting justices. To them,
"hostile environment" rules directly address the impact of speech on the
victimized worker in same manner that the majority's opinion prohib-
ited.275 In making this point, however, neither Justice White nor any of
the other dissenters suggested that they viewed Title VII regulation as
constitutionally suspect. Instead, they simply pointed out the inconsis-
tency in the majority's opinion. Whatever the merits of either side's ar-
gument, it seems clear that none of the nine justices saw R.A. V as a real
threat to Title VII.
Despite the implicit assurance in R.A. V that Title VII rules appear
consistent with the First Amendment, we share some of the concerns of
Professor Kinsley Browne, who argues that the courts and commentators
too quickly dismiss First Amendment concerns arising from hostile envi-
ronment cases.27 6 Addressing this issue, Professor Browne raises a
number of fairly compelling points:
Far from having an "incidental effect" on the right of speech, regula-
tion of offensive speech has as its primary purpose the limitation of
"offensive" expression, often in the form of "offensive" ideas, that has
no relation to any threat of future action. Although advocates of such
regulation may argue that there is no desire to censor ideas, only to
guarantee equal participation of women or blacks in the workplace, the
fact remains that the purpose of the regulation is to prohibit expression
because of the ideology expressed.277
274. Under this doctrine, regulations that legitimately target conduct incidentally ac-
companying speech do not violate the First Amendment so long as the regulations are not
directed at the content of the speech. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968). According to the R.A. V majority, the key to the constitutionality of such
"speech/conduct" regulations is that the government "does not target conduct on the
basis of its expressive content." R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546-47.
275. According to Justice White:
Title VII is similar to the St. Paul ordinance that the majority condemns be-
cause "it impose[s] special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects." ... Under the broad principle the Court uses to decide the
present case, hostile work environment claims based on sexual harassment
should fail First Amendment review; because a general ban on harassment in
the workplace would cover the problem of sexual harassment, any attempt to
proscribe the subcategory of sexually harassing expression would violate the
First Amendment.
R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2557 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Moreover, according
to Justice White, the speech regulated in hostile environment cases is the conduct that is
prohibited in many cases, and penalizing this expression under Title VII "reaches beyond
any 'incidental' effect on speech." Id
276. See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harass-
ment and the First Amendment, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 481 (1991); see also Cathleen M. Mogan,
Current Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Law: Time to Stop Defendants From
Having Their Cake and Eating It Too, 6 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 543, 571-
73 (1992) (discussing the "grinding tension" between freedom of expression and the
rights of women and minorities).
277. Browne, supra note 276, at 515.
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Browne particularly takes issue with what he terms the "thought-con-
trol" rationale of restricting expression that runs through the reasoning
of judges and academics. Criticizing this reasoning, he reiterates Justice
Brandeis' celebration of the First Amendment's "freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think,"27 as "a duty to think as you are told and
to speak as you are told to think." '279
We see considerable merit in Browne's argument. If, in the workplace,
we permit only speech that "reasonable women" consider acceptable, we
run a very real risk of suppressing basic First Amendment freedoms. We
continue to subscribe to the proposition that, with the possible exception
of speech that constitutes insubordination or a clear violation of legiti-
mate work rules, the best antidote to hateful or harassing speech in the
workplace is not suppression, but debate and refutation.
4. A Multitude of "Reasonable Victim" Standards
Title VII bars discriminatory behavior based not only on sex, but also
based on race, color, religion, or national origin. If the courts are to
apply a "reasonable woman" standard in sexual harassment cases, does
this suggest that a "reasonable victim" standard will apply in other hos-
278. Id. at 549 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
279. Id. According to Browne:
It is but a small step from requiring a person to refrain from expressing beliefs
in the hope that he will cease to hold them to requiring a person to express
beliefs in the hope that he will begin to hold them. If the state may justify a
prohibition on a person's saying "blacks are inferior" by pointing to the effect of
the prohibition on a person's beliefs, the state should have equivalent power to
require that a person affirm a belief in racial equality on the ground that re-
peated affirmation will cause the person to come to believe it, and, once having
come to believe it, to conform his actions to his newly acquired beliefs .... In
addition to its Orwellian overtones, the assumption that beliefs can be altered
by forbidding expression is probably wrong.
Id. at 549-50. One recent law review comment dismisses Browne's concerns by arguing
that restricting sexually explicit photographs and other behavior found to be sexually
harassing should occur only in work situations that have been traditionally male domi-
nated or in workplaces where the sexes are segregated by job. See Amy Horton, Com-
ment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First
Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 403, 448 (1991).
Although qualifying restrictions on speech and expression in this limited way has a sur-
face appeal, one might question the wisdom of conditioning the right to free expression
upon whether it makes those exposed to it uncomfortable. Free speech ought not be
restricted simply because others find it offensive. Moreover, we see no evidence that sup-
porters of restrictions on speech and expression in the name of reducing sexual harass-
ment accept the limitations suggested by Ms. Horton. See, e.g., Dana S. Connell,
Effective Sexual Harassment Policies: Unexpected Lessons from Jacksonville Shipyards,
17 Employee Relations L.J. 191 (Autumn 1991) (urging employers generally to adopt
rules barring the display or possession of "sexually suggestive" materials). One approach
cited with approval by Connell defines "sexually suggestive materials" as those that de-
pict "a person of either sex who is not fully clothed or in clothes that are not suited to or
ordinarily accepted for the accomplishment of routine work in and around the [work-
place] and who is posed for the obvious purpose of displaying or drawing attention to
private portions of his or her body." Id. at 200-01.
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tile environment cases? We see no basis for refusing to extend the rea-
soning in Ellison and similar sexual discrimination cases to causes of
action involving other classes protected under Title VII.
One court has already extended the reasoning of Ellison to racial dis-
crimination cases. In Harris v. International Paper Co.,2 the district
court judge explicitly adopted the standard of the "reasonable black per-
son" in determining whether a work setting constituted a hostile environ-
ment, stating that "[t]he appropriate standard to be applied in hostile
environment harassment cases is that of a reasonable person from the
protected group of which the alleged victim is a member." ''
Further, at least one judge, inspired by the Ellison case, would apply a
"reasonable nonadherent" test in matters involving religious rights. In
Murray v. City of Austin,282 the plaintiff, an atheist, challenged the City
of Austin's right to use a Christian cross in its insignia. Although the
Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's freedom of religion claims,283 Judge
Goldberg's dissent challenged the majority's view that the city had acted
properly, raising the same arguments used by the court in Ellison.2 '
Had this case been brought under Title VII by a city employee offended
by having to wear such an insignia, the majority would have found it
more difficult to dismiss the plaintiff's claims, at least if it followed the
Ellison rationale.
If consistency rules in those courts that adopt the "reasonable woman"
standard, we see no way for them to avoid adopting similar standards in
cases involving race, color, religion, or national origin. To say the least,
this presents serious concerns for corporate officials who must comply
with Title VII in future years as increasing numbers of women and racial,
ethnic, and religious minorities enter the job market.2"5 Tailoring the
280. 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me.), vacated in part for other reasons, 765 F. Supp. 1529
(1991).
281. Id. at 1516 n.12.
282. 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992).
283. See icL at 158 (5th Cir. 1991). According to the majority, the cross did not violate
the establishment clause given the length of time it had used the insignia, and given that it
had no proselytizing effect and did not endorse religion. See id.
284. Judge Goldberg argued that:
Majoritarian adherents, construing a government action devoid of religious
purpose, may not perceive the endorsement message that the minority receives
with stinging clarity. Only through sensitivity to the nonadherent can we effect
the constitutional values inherent in the Religion Clauses. Cf Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 878-80 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting perspective of "reasonable wo-
man" in order to effect statutory aim of sex discrimination statute). Yet, by
insisting that the test be an objective one-a "reasonable nonadherent" test-
the endorsement inquiry retains the ability to discount the perceptions of a hy-
persensitive plaintiff.
Murray, 947 F.2d at 165 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
285. See William B. Johnston, Hudson Institute, Workforce 2000: Work and Workers
For the Twenty-first Century (1987). This report from the Hudson Institute, which fore-
casts substantial demographic changes, has sometimes been misinterpreted to indicate
that white males will no longer be in the majority in the year 2000. This is incorrect.
What will change is the mix of new entrants in the workforce. By the year 2000, non-
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workplace to avoid offending "reasonable Haitians," "reasonable
blacks," "reasonable Asians," "reasonable Rastafarians," "reasonable
Muslims," as well as "reasonable women," may prove to be an insupera-
ble task.
5. Rights in Conflict
Closely related to, but conceptually distinct from, the issue of accom-
modating the rights of a multitude of "reasonable victims" protected
under Title VII is the problem of resolving conflicts among the protected
groups. How, for example, is an employer to deal with the claims of
Muslim women that the relatively skimpy attire worn by other female
employees offends their more restrictive dress code? Similarly, how
should a supervisor respond to a Jewish employee who claims to be
deeply pained by office Christmas parties or pictures of Jesus displayed
by her Christian co-workers?
Virtually none of the courts or commentators who have addressed the
"reasonable victim" or "reasonable woman" issue in harassment cases
has explicitly discussed how to resolve such conflicts between protected
groups.2" 6 Following the principles adopted in the "reasonable woman"
cases and the authors cited in those cases, the most likely approach
would be to resolve conflicts by accommodating the concerns of "reason-
able victims" in whichever group the court determined to be less power-
ful. Presumably one would not search for a middle-ground "reasonable
person" solution because that would diminish the less powerful group's
ability to participate on an equal footing28 ' with the relatively more pow-
erful group.288
white, women, and immigrants will make up more than five-sixths of the new entrants in
the job market. See id. at 85-103. Only 15% of new entrants to the labor force in the
years 1987 to 2000 will be native white males, compared to 47% in 1987. See id. at xiii.
286. See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 2, at 1217-19 (recognizing, but failing to suggest
solutions to, such conflicts).
287. As stated by the Ellison court:
We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman primarily because we believe
that a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to
systematically ignore the experiences of women .... [A] gender-conscious ex-
amination of sexual harassment enables women to participate in the workplace
on an equal footing with men.
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
288. Professor Deborah A. Stone offers what we believe to be a view typical of many
current commentaries. According to Professor Stone, in determining which group's stan-
dard of behavior should prevail in a harassment case, the test should: "reflect how the
action looks to the weaker party, given the real disparity of power. It is a mockery of the
liberal ideal of autonomy to interpret a potentially coercive relationship from the point of
view of the person who has the power to coerce." Deborah A. Stone, Race, Gender, and
the Supreme Court, The American Prospect 63, 69 (Winter 1992). Her view is widely
shared. See, e.g., Riger, supra note 5, at 503 (arguing that in deciding which sex's defini-
tion of harassment should prevail, policymakers "need to learn to 'think like a woman' "
in order to equalize power in the workplace); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All:
Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003 (1986) (advocating an "anti-
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There are some obvious practical problems with this approach. For
example, do we really expect employers to order female employees to
wear veils at work or to stop wearing lipstick because doing so deeply
offends female employees from other disadvantaged groups? Must wo-
men who have fought for the right to wear slacks on the job give up that
right because a newly hired immigrant finds it painful, as a "reasonable
immigrant," to work in an atmosphere where such modes of dress are
permitted?
We cannot necessarily resolve these conflicts by saying that members
of protected minority groups in the workforce must simply accept ex-
isting majority practices that deeply offend them. The point of "hostile
environment" cases is that members of the majority must alter behavior,
including acts that they consider innocent, reasonable and well-inten-
tioned, that disturbs protected minorities.2 89 The majority may disregard
the feelings of the protected minority member only if she is hypersensi-
tive for her group.
6. Fairness
To us, one of the most ethically difficult problems raised by current
interpretations of Title VII is that behavior considered to be innocent by
reasonable men may in fact be found illegal in a court of law. As we have
documented, however, a growing number of courts find no significant
problem in requiring men to take on this burden. Many commentators,
including Professor Stone, agree:
Are men supposed to be mind-readers, you ask? Well, yes. Parents,
who exercise inordinate physical and psychological control over chil-
dren, are morally and legally obliged to understand their children's
subordination" policy that removes any policy which contributes in intent or effect to the
subordination of a historically dominated group).
289. In criticizing this approach, Professor Browne notes:
Ironically, though couched in terms of discriminatory treatment, the real claim
in many harassment cases is that the work atmosphere did not change in re-
sponse to the addition of women (or minorities) to the environment. The ra-
tionale is that conduct that appears harmless to men may be offensive to
women, although such reasoning seems inconsistent, at least superficially, with
the view that Title VII "rejects the notion of 'romantic paternalism' towards
women." For example, the court in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia rejected the
argument that the environment was not a hostile one because "a police station
need not be run like a day care center," stating that neither should it have "the
ambience of a nineteenth century military barracks," although an all-male po-
lice station having such an ambience would certainly not violate Title VII. The
court also noted that although men might find the obscenity and pornography
that pervaded the workplace "harmless and innocent," women might well "feel
otherwise," and such expression may be "highly offensive to a woman who
seeks to deal with her fellow employees and clients with professional dignity
and without the barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse." As a consequence
a locker room atmosphere that was perfectly legal before the entry of wmen into
the job becomes illegal thereafter.
Browne, supra note 276, at 487-88 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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needs, even when their children can't talk. They are not free to abuse
children because the children don't protest. In any situation of power,
the powerful have a moral obligation to see the world from the point of
view of those they govern or control, and to exercise power in the in-
terests of the governed. Just consent is what makes power legitimate
instead of tyrannical.... As long as men are in positions of power, the
burden is on them to anticipate how their actions affect weaker people.
This is the burden that goes with the privilege of power.290
It is obviously true that, as Professor Stone argues, the powerful should
not simply run roughshod over the weak. But this does not automati-
cally translate into imposing legal liability whenever the powerful unin-
tentionally offend the weak. We do not, for example, bar the rich from
wearing expensive clothes or eating elegant meals simply because this
conduct may distress the poor. Professor Stone's parent-child analogy
also overlooks the intimacy of family life, which is very different from the
atmosphere of the workplace. In the family context, society places enor-
mous, albeit not unbridled, discretion in the hands of parents with re-
spect to their children's punishment, education, and life-styles, however
unhappy that may make children on occasion. In modem society, we
would never provide this much discretion to employers.
One finds it hard to avoid the conclusion that Professor Stone and
others would impose liability under Title VII whenever men in powerful
positions unintentionally engage in behavior that pains relatively less
powerful women. But the all-encompassing nature of this approach trou-
bles us. In our opinion, the right to sue and collect damages should de-
rive from a stronger moral base than a worker's discomfort at well-
intentioned behavior of questionable offensiveness. Further, until society
reaches a stronger consensus on the proper response to "mild" forms of
sexual harassment such as a male employee making comments about a
female coworker's appearance, staring at a woman's figure, or touching a
female coworker in a non-sexual manner, it seems premature to permit
employees offended by this conduct to sue in pursuit of large money
damages.29
As with many interesting and important social and legal questions, the
dividing line between what is acceptable and unacceptable is not clear.
At some point, however, the commendable effort by women to restruc-
ture the workplace environment can take on oppressive tones of its own.
If we are to avoid excessive "political correctness" or "sexual correct-
ness" in the workplace, we must promote a spirit of tolerance that for-
gives well-intentioned slights from above and below.
On this point, we return to Professor Tannen's discussion regarding
290. Stone, supra note 288, at 69.
29 1. Of course, any of these behaviors, if carried to an extreme, can present a problem
that might justify a lawsuit. But feminist writers such as Ehrenreich, Riger, and Abrams
also argue that milder versions of these behaviors should be considered sexual harass-
ment. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
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the different conversational styles between men and women. In that dis-
cussion, she strikes a strong note for tolerance on the part of both sexes:
Many experts tell us we are doing things wrong and should change our
behavior-which usually sounds easier than it turns out to be. Sensi-
tivity training judges men by women's standards, trying to get them to
talk more like women. Assertiveness training judges women by men's
standards and tries to get them to talk more like men. No doubt,
many people can be helped by learning to be more sensitive or more
assertive. But few people are helped by being told they are doing
everything all wrong.... The biggest mistake is believing there is one
right way to listen, to talk, to have a conversation-or a relationship.
Nothing hurts more than being told your intentions are bad when you
know they are good, or being told you are doing something wrong
when you know you're just doing it your way.292
We recommend that courts apply Professor Tannen's perspective to sex-
ual harassment cases, balancing the very real need to provide appropriate
relief to the victims of sexual harassment with understanding and toler-
ance toward well-meaning companies and individuals who are at least
trying to do the right thing.
CONCLUSION
Efforts to eradicate social evils such as sexual discrimination inevitably
raise substantial legal and ethical issues. This Article has addressed one
such issue: whether the benefits of applying the reasonable woman stan-
dard in sexual discrimination cases brought under Title VII will out-
weigh the questions and risks raised by the standard. As with any new
legal norm, it will be difficult to assess the true impact of the reasonable
woman standard until several years of application have elapsed. Our dis-
cussion has not been intended to reject or condemn the new standard so
much as it has been to point out that trying to protect the rights of one
group unavoidably results in some restriction of the rights of other
groups. In some cases, this is justifiable. In others, it is not. We will
watch with great interest to see how the benefits and risks balance out in
the great "reasonable woman" debate.
292. Tannen, supra note 201, at 297-98.
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